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Contents / Sommaire / Inhalt

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JOURNAL OF NORTHERN STUDIES 1 • 2009, PP. 7–11

JOHAN SCHIMANSKI, STEPHEN WOLFE AND EINAR NIEMI

Introduction

Cultural Production and Negotiation of Northern Borders

The articles we are presenting here were all first given as papers at the 2008 European Conference of the Association of Borderlands Studies, held in Kirkenes in Northern Norway, September 11–13, on the borders of the Arctic and in the Finnish-Kven-Norwegian-Russian-Sami borderland.[1] The theme of the conference was a wide one: the "Cultural Production and Negotiation of Borders." This theme was intended as an acknowledgement of the increasing focus that has been given recently by geographers and historians to the role of cultural production and negotiation in social and territorial bordering processes. The ongoing spate of movies, documentaries, art projects, novels, websites, festivals and tourist attractions concerning borders has given this aspect of bordering renewed topicality and economic importance, and has attracted research both in the humanities and in the social sciences. The stories such cultural practices and artefacts tell, and the images they project, give extra weight to issues of the location of borders and of border populations. In some cases, the border itself—a wall or a fence—becomes a cultural icon of great significance in the media and in everyday discourse. In a world of mobilities and securities, the outer peripheries of states are clearly linked to their hybridized inner landscapes and even to the bodies of immigrants and other border-crossers themselves. The cultural negotiation of contested borders is a crucial element of ongoing problems of security, freedom of movement, economic differentials, trafficking, fear of the other, etc.; it also promises the possibility of a creative refiguring of borders and cultural border zones into economically and symbolically productive sites of dialogue, crossing, hybridity and creativity. All these phenomena are the product of historical proc-

esses and take place in a shifting historical landscape that both creates a framework for and is formed by cultural practices.

The conference was thus envisaged as an interdisciplinary conference which would cross the academic divide between "border studies" in the social sciences and "border theory"/"border poetics" in the humanities. It aimed to examine the ways in which cultural practices use discursive and semiotic strategies in order to imagine and negotiate the border in its social and historical context and to further our understanding of the role of culture in subjective interactions with the border by border crossers and by border zone dwellers. While focusing on bottom-up perspectives, papers raised questions about the need for localized solutions in top-down policy-making, actualised with the increasing economic significance of cultural production and consumption. They asked who initiates and who benefits from such cultural practices, and what their symbolic effects are for social conditions. They aimed to place cultural processes of bordering in historical contexts and show the role of cultural memory in the formation of borderscapes. They traced the transferability of the border concept to questions of identity, subjectivity and medial exposition as facilitated by cultural practices.

A special focus of the conference was on the region in which it is set: the Norwegian-Russian-Finnish-Kven-Sami borderland and the wider contexts of the North Calotte, Barents and Arctic regions. The Arctic is an area in which the borders of the environment and energy production are being changed and are changing the geographical, historical, imaginative sense of place and space. This is a transborder region of a layered, complex border history, of pressing social and environmental problems and possibilities involving many different cultural identities and ways of life, and of high importance today as a political and cultural hotpoint of "Western"-Russian relations within the Arctic and Sub-Arctic context. Kirkenes, an old mining town, lies at a point where the interests of many nations and indigenous/minority groups meet, and has been a place of social, economic, environmental, military and cultural confrontation. It is a site of economic and cultural creativity involving the aspirations and self-narratives of local, national and global elites in an atmosphere of hybridity; mining has been re-established and is regaining its former strength in spite of the current economic recession. It is centrally placed in relation to the ongoing construction and contestation of territorial and symbolic borders in the Arctic Sea against a background of rapid economic development of oil and gas resources. The conference also included a final summing-up panel made up of scholars working from different perspectives on the Norwegian-Russian-Finnish-Kven-Sami borderscape.

The conference included in all 48 papers, 22 of which dealt specifically with borderlands between Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Some of the more general papers will be appearing in separate special issues of the *Journal of Borderlands Studies* and *Nordlit*.[2] For the *Journal of Northern Studies* we have selected a group of essays that address the Northern theme of the conference from the viewpoint of different disciplines. Looking at selected borderlands in Northern Scandinavia, they also use historical contextualization and elements of discourse analysis to show how culture takes part in bordering processes, primarily through the construction of imagined border landscapes into which local and national identities can be inscribed.

Anne Heith compares various literary treatments of the Korpela movement, a 1930s millenarian grouping in the Finnish-Swedish borderlands. She argues that contemporary author Bengt Pohjanen's treatment represents a disruptive form of nation-writing and that this is connected to his project of creating an alternative imaginary geography of the Torne valley.

Anastasia Rogova uses anthropological fieldwork (interview material) among Russians living in the border town of Kirkenes, the site of the conference, to argue that some Russians live in a "borderland" which constitutes another space, outside the space of the Russian-Norwegian divide. By focusing on individual experiences and on discursive phenomena such as jokes and newspaper articles, and placing them in a historical context, she shows how this space has been constructed discursively.

Jukka Nyyssönen uses border theory to argue that changing bordering processes between Finnish Finland and the Skolt Sami in the Finnish-Norwegian-Russian borderland, as reflected in the writings of two Finnish scholars writing in the 1930s and 1970s respectively, is related to changes in historical context and in Finnish self-definition. He characterizes these changes as postcolonial.

Rolf Inge Larsen uses discourse analysis to show that the liturgy used in the consecration of the church in Skibotn in 1931 reveals discourses of ethnic stigmatization and counter-stigmatization in relation to local Sami and Kven populations. These must be read against the background of a Norwegian cultural borderland policy in the face of a perceived "Finnish menace."

Magnus Rodell argues that discursive forces created an enemy image of a Russified Finland in Sweden in the late nineteenth century, that various material artefacts were used to reinforce the bordering this image encouraged, and that the fortifications in Boden were a result of a narrative combining representations of northern wilderness, expansionist potential, trade and defence needs.

Roald Berg presents historical arguments for adjusting Karl Deutsch's 1950s "pluralistic security community" model for the Scandinavian coun-

tries, bringing in a cultural dimension by invoking Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities. He connects this to the political and infrastructural aspects of national borders.

We hope through this special issue to further put the North on the map of border studies and to give momentum to the study of bordering processes within Northern Studies.

NOTES

[1] See report in *La Frontera* (29: 2, 2009) newsletter of the Association for Borderlands Studies, http://www.absborderlands.org/2laFrontera.html. The conference was arranged by the Border Poetics research group (http://uit.no/borderpoetics) at the University of Tromsø in close cooperation with the History Department and the CEPIN (Citizenship, Encounters and Place Enactment in the North) research school there, the Petrozavodsk State University and vitally, the Barents Institute in Kirkenes itself. Various policy and cultural groups were also involved, such as the Kirkenes cultural production outfit Pikene på broen, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, the Borderlands Museum, the Akademisk Kvarter bookshop, the Pasvikturist tourist agency and the Samovarteatret.

[2] *Nordlit* open access web site: <http://www2.uit.no/www/ansatte/organisasjon/publikasjoner?p_dimension_id=31184&p_menu=42435>.



Map of parts of Northern Scandinavia and North-West Russia, showing borders and places mentioned in the articles in this special issue. The dotted line marks the Finnish-Russian border 1920–1944, when Finland had a corridor giving access to the Barents Sea. The numbered areas show Skolt Sami *siida*s before resettlement in post-war Finland: 1. Näätämö, 2. Paatsjoki, 3. Petsamo, 4. Muotka, 5. Suonkylä (cf. Nyysönen's article and Sámi Museum Siida map, http://www.siida.fi/). The *siida*s overlapped national borders (smaller overlaps into present-day Finland are not marked) and in some cases each other. Map: Frøydis Strand.

JOURNAL OF NORTHERN STUDIES 1 • 2009, PP. 13–29

ANNE HEITH

Millenarianism and the Narration of the Nation

Narratives about the Korpela Movement

ABSTRACT The Korpela movement was a millenarian movement which emerged in Northern Sweden in the nineteen-thirties. The article explores the use of historical subject matter about the movement in newspaper journalism, literary writing, and in the branding of Toivo Korpela and the Korpela movement on the World Wide Web in the context of present-day marketing of attractions for visitors.

The argument of this article is that the literary writings of Henning and Ernst Sjöström and Bengt Pohjanen respectively represent two conflicting ways of narrating the Swedish nation. The Sjöström brothers' novel *Silverarken* ['The silver ark'] represents a nationalist pedagogy in which the narrative of the nation exemplifies a teleology of progress. This mode of narrating is problemized by a double narrative movement which includes a "'timeless' discourse of irrationality" (Bhabha), exemplified in a number of Bengt Pohjanen's novels, which destabilizes and deconstructs the narration of the nation as a story about homogeneity and linear progress. This latter mode of narrating makes visible the split in the narration of the nation between the progressive, accumulative temporality of the modern Swedish welfare state and the performative subversion of an alternative logic which is also claimed to be representative.

KEYWORDS Korpela movement, Torne Valley, millenarianism, narrating the nation, Homi K. Bhabha, Meänmaa, Meänkieli, Bengt Pohjanen, the prophetic belt

Millenarianism and the Narration of the Nation

The Torne Valley on both sides of the Torne River, which has marked the border between Sweden and Finland since 1809, has become an increasingly contested area in the Swedish national imagery. Before the border was established, Finland had been a part of Sweden for more

than six hundred years. As a result of the peace negotiations with Russia in 1809, the Tornedalian Finnish population found itself divided by the new national border. Years of enhanced Swedish nationalism followed and the northern border area became increasingly important strategically (Åselius 1994). With the implementation of a nationalist pedagogy, the status of the Tornedalian Finnish population in Sweden became increasingly ambiguous.

Lars Elenius claims that the Tornedalian Finns in Sweden were not politically discriminated against, but that they were subjected to an assimilatory language policy from the latter part of the nineteenth century (Elenius 2006: 255). This account of the status of the Tornedalian Finnish minority in Sweden, which reduces the importance of the theme of marginalization and disempowerment, is in stark contrast to accounts provided in texts by prominent Swedish Tornedalian Finnish authors. In the poem "I was born without language," which has been reprinted several times, Bengt Pohjanen presents a sombre picture of identity loss, related to the loss of language (Heith 2007: 235).[1] Another example is found in Mikael Niemi's *Populärmusik från Vittula* ['Popular music from Vittula'], in which the narrator ironically enumerates what the Tornedalian Finnish children were taught at school. The enumeration ends as follows: "We spoke broken Finnish without being Finns, we spoke broken Swedish without being Swedes. We were nothing" (Niemi 2000: 50, my translation).

The apparent discrepancy between Elenius' account and those of Pohjanen and Niemi, is related to the different functions of historiography and fiction. While the first presents changes in assimilation and minority politics in various contexts over time, the latter presents subjective individual experiences at a given moment. This, I propose, indicates that literary writing may provide a space where the emotional content of experiences related to ethnic and linguistic minority status is explored. This involves that the history of the Tornedalian Finnish population in Sweden emerges as more problematic and ambiguous in the genre of fiction, than in, for example, the historiography of Elenius.

The main focus of this article will be a comparison of fictional representations of the Korpela movement, by the brothers Ernst and Henning Sjöström and Bengt Pohjanen. These specimens of literary writing are interpreted as instances where two conflicting ways of narrating the modern Swedish nation are deployed. The theoretical framework of this reading is provided by Homi K. Bhabha's discussion of nationalism and narratives of the nation in the essay "DissemiNation," published in *The Location of Culture* (Bhabha 2008).

One claim of this article is that the ambiguity of the status of the

Tornedalian Finnish population in Sweden is related to tensions between majority culture and national identity, on the one hand, and regional particularity and popular minority culture, on the other. This tension is apparent in representations of the millenarian, popular, revivalist movement, the Korpela movement. It is clear that the Korpela movement represents "otherness" from the perspective of dominant culture. However the "strangeness" of the movement was related not only to religious practices by the journalists who wrote about it in the nineteen-thirties. Frequently Finnish and Sami ethnicity, the use of the Finnish language, poverty, backwardness, a propensity for mysticism and isolation, were foregrounded as components that distinguish the local popular northern culture from that of the modern Swedish welfare-state. Thus various symbolic thresholds were established, which have contributed to excluding the northern ethnic and linguistic minorities from the imagined community of the nation.

The Korpela movement

For a couple of years in the nineteen-thirties there was a group of people mainly in the Swedish Torne Valley, in the northernmost border area between Sweden, Finland and Norway, who waited for a flying ark which was to come to take them to Palestine. They had been told that this would happen by local prophets who predicted that the world would come to an end on 24 July 1937 (Lundmark 1985: 30–32). One event that had sparked off the prophecy was the publication of a new Finnish translation of the Bible in 1934. This was seen as an abomination by two preachers who were inspired from their reading of the old translation of the Bible, particularly the doomsday prophecy and the mentioning of an abomination in the *The Book of Daniel* (Lundmark 1985: 30).[2] Inspired by the *The Revelation of St. John the Divine* the two prophets predicted that they themselves would be admitted to heaven and that approximately a year later an ark would arrive to pick up the rest of the true believers (Lundmark 1985: 30–31).[3] In the apocalypse to come the true believers would be saved while all the rest would be destroyed, as would the entirety of Scandinavia (Lundmark 1985: 32).

The doomsday prophets, who began preaching in the Torne Valley in the nineteen-thirties, and their followers have become known as "the Korpela movement." Toivo Korpela was a Finnish preacher who began preaching among the Laestadians[4] in the Swedish Torne Valley in the winter of 1928–29. At the time he was a fairly young man—he was born in 1900 in Ähtäri in the Finnish province of Ostrobothnia. Although there was a conflict between Korpela and the leaders of the Laestadian movement, he attracted followers. There were also rumours accusing him of being a communist and of having swindled money from people. The truth of these rumours has not

been confirmed and it is doubtful if there is any substance in them (Lundmark 1985: 29). However, it is clear that Toivo Korpela was a controversial person who attracted followers but also provoked adversaries. In January 1934 he left Sweden for Ähtäri. After that two self-proclaimed prophets, Sigurd Siikavaara and Arthur Niemi, introduced the belief in an imminent apocalypse and the arrival of an ark. During the spring and summer of 1934 they preached the new message in villages in the Torne Valley and during a trip to Kiruna (Lundmark 1985: 32). The news reached Toivo Korpela, who wrote to Siikavaara and asked him to join him at a place near the border between Sweden and Finland. They met and together they went north to preach in various villages. Niemi joined them and they continued to journey and preach all three of them together.

In January 1935 Korpela left the other two in the Finnish village of Sieppijärvi. He went home to Ähtäri and never returned to Sweden after that (Lundmark 1985: 34). When they were in Sieppijärvi, Siikavaara and Niemi preached about the ark for the first and only time in Finland (Lundmark 1985: 34). According to Lennart Lundmark Korpela himself was not pleased with the development, but still he remained something of a cult figure for many of the members of the movement (Lundmark 1985: 34). However, when Korpela dissociated himself from the doctrine of the ark in interviews published in various newspapers, one of the prophets demanded at a meeting in April 1935 that he should be condemned to the deepest recesses of Hell. This was also performed and consequently it was considered within the movement that Korpela no longer had any part to play in it (Lundmark 1985: 35). This of course implies that after this it is not fair to attribute the ideas and practices of the movement to direct influences from Toivo Korpela. In spite of this I will follow the practice of Lennart Lundmark and use the denomination "the Korpela movement" since it has, by popular consent, become established under that name (Lundmark 1985: 35).

Millenarianism—Religion of the Oppressed

The phenomenon of millenarianism may, following Lundmark, be defined as a collective reaction to a crisis involving cultic and miraculous elements (Lundmark 1985: 10). The salvation of the members, that is the group which shares a belief in millenarianism, is seen as collective, realised on earth, imminent, total in the sense that there is a belief that life on earth will be completely transformed and that a new rule will lead to perfection, and last but not least, that the transformation is accomplished through miracles (Lundmark 1985: 10–11).[5] One important Biblical source for these beliefs is found in *The Revelation of St. John the Divine* where a thousand-year earthly Kingdom is predicted.

Millenarian movements may be interpreted from various points of departure (Lundmark 1985: 17–22). One is reflected already in the denominations "the Korpela movement" or "the Siikavaara sect," which both foreground the presence of charismatic leaders. In the nineteen-thirties when the Korpela movement became known all over Sweden through articles written by reporters who were sent to the Torne Valley, the role of the leaders became a *leitmotif*.[6] However it is a simplification to foreground charisma as the only explanation of a millenarian movement's success (Lundmark 1985: 18–22). Other factors of importance are the social context of the charismatic person and the character of the beliefs propagated. In order to attract followers and initiate action, the message of the charismatic person must be relevant to the group that is being addressed. The role of social context and interaction is further emphasised by interpretations which foreground the dialectic character of the exchange between a leader and followers. One strand in these interpretations is the notion that leaders are chosen and empowered by followers experiencing unfulfilled expectations (Lundmark 1985: 18–19).

Other explanations of the rise of millenarianism highlight economic and political factors. Theories which foreground the element of protest against cultural, political and economic oppression are of particular interest with regard to the ethnic and linguistic backdrop of the Korpela movement. One element in the construction of symbolic thresholds between Swedish majority culture and Tornedalian Finnish culture, I propose, is related to asymmetries when it comes to the modernisation of Swedish society. Elenius points out that there were differences in the process of industrialisation between Sweden and Finland, and that the Finnish-speaking population of the Swedish Torne Valley was cut off from the enhanced process of modernisation, which transformed areas with a Swedish-speaking population (Elenius 2006: 255).

In a study of millenarianism deriving from a colonial status Vittorio Lanternari describes it as "the religion of the oppressed" (Lanternari 1963).[7] The study does not foreground other relationships than that between millenarianism and colonial pressure. In spite of this it is interesting as a backdrop to Bengt Pohjanen's present-day use of historical material about the Korpela movement in literary texts. These texts frequently express a critique of Swedish assimilation politics and the development of the modern welfare state from a perspective that implies a focus on the impact of ethnic and linguistic minority status. It is a fact that modernity came to the Torne Valley later than to other parts of Sweden and that there was a conflict between old and new in the nineteen-thirties when the traditional way of life was transformed quite dramatically by social, religious and political changes.

The Korpela Movement in the Discourse of Historiography

Lundmark's point of departure in *Protest och profetia. Korpela-rörelsen och drömmen om tidens ände* ['Protest and prophecy. The Korpela movement and the dream of the end of time'] is that of a researcher in the academic discipline of history (Lundmark 1985). The study examines the Korpela movement retrospectively after it had ceased to exist. It is based primarily on material collected by authorities who were dealing with the movement. An important section of the written sources consists of material from the police investigation in connection with the trial of sect members in 1939. Other sources include reports from medical authorities involved in the investigation of the mental status of sect members, clergymen who reported on the religious beliefs of the movement, and educational authorities and child welfare committees which intervened when children were taken from sectarian parents considered to exercise an unsound influence over their children. Lundmark is careful not to foreground any single explanation, such as the existence of a charismatic leader, to account for the success of the movement. Rather he points to the impact of multiple factors in a time of social change and the dialectic interaction between members of the movement, and the movement as well as non-believers, as ingredients which triggered the events which came to an end when the police intervened in 1939. Lundmark is cautious not to revert to sensationalism either.

The Korpela Movement in Contemporary Journalism

The activities of the Korpela movement were recorded both by regional and national newspapers during the years when the Korpelians fired the imaginations of journalists who were covering the story about the movement. The truth of Lundmark's observation that the journalists frequently were carried away in the spread of rumours and the production of cock-and-bull stories is confirmed by a look at contemporary material from newspaper archives (Lundmark 1985: 23).[8] Frequently headlines foreground the beliefs and practices of the members as bizarre, often in a condescending, mocking tone as in "Woman teacher resigns in order to fly with crystal ark" (my translation).[9] There are numerous examples of insinuations of Toivo Korpela's presumed dishonesty, communist sympathies and lack of education and charisma, which contribute to making the success of the movement utterly incomprehensible—at least for the journalists who view the movement and the rumours about it from the outside, from the position of rational, educated and modern spectators. One typical headline proclaims that "The prophet of the flying ark still an illiterate at the age of 25!" The subtitles go on stating that "Preached over

Bible texts that others had to read. — Clear proofs of the profitability of the tours to Sweden" (my translation).[10] There are also attempts at explaining the movement's success which explicitly emphasise the isolation of the people in the villages, poverty, harsh living conditions and lack of the benefits of a modern life style. The result is a construction of the members as the marginal, incomprehensible Others of modern, enlightened Swedes.

In the construction of otherness there are frequent references to ethnic and linguistic deviances from the national majority culture—often with a racist bias. In an article about a visit to a Korpela meeting in Kiruna, the journalist from the national newspaper *Aftonbladet* describes the gathered people as "strange:" "Tough sinewy men, hardened by laborious work and hardship in the wilds, swarthy Finn types with sly, deceitful looks, small, dry old men, twisted as mountain birches. Many of the women wear black kerchiefs in an old-fashioned way" (my translation). The article's subtitle particularly foregrounds the ethnic and linguistic otherness of the gathering: "Monotonous babbling in Finnish from noon till night" (my translation).[11] In another article, "Witchcraft is still sometimes used against illness in Lapland" (my translation),[12] the journalist who was sent by the national newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* gives another example of how a dichotomy between the modern, civilised south and the backward, peripheral north may be constructed. In the article's introduction a connection is established between the success of the Korpela movement, Sami and Finnish ethnicity and a pre-modern life style. The district medical officer, who is being interviewed together with the visiting journalist, represents rationalism and modernity. There is no mistake about the condescending tone when it is stated that it must be kept in mind that the northern parts of the province of Norrland still are a wasteland and that the Sami and Finnish speaking population north of the Arctic circle still occasionally use witchcraft in spite of electricity and the radio. One major component of the otherness of the Sami and Finnish ethnic and linguistic minorities is that they are made to represent an earlier evolutionary and historical phase compared to that of modern Swedes. The notion of superiority connected with education, rationalism, modernity and living in the centre is central to the constructed dichotomy. The members of the Korpela movement are connected with ethnic and linguistic minorities, poverty, lack of education, anti-rationalism and a marginal position, both with regard to national majority culture, and ideas of a geographical centre. However, the situation has changed today as these notions circulated in the medias' construction of reality in the nineteen-thirties, and may be critically examined from the context of ethnic and linguistic mobilisation inspired by critical theory, deconstruction and postcolonial theory.[13]

The Korpela Movement According to the Sjöström Brothers

One example where the historical material about the Korpela movement plays a prominent role is the novel *Silverarken* ['The silver ark'] from 1969, written by the successful lawyer Henning Sjöström and his brother Ernst Sjöström. The novel contrasts followers and antagonists of the movement throughout. While the narrator and focalizer shifts in the novel, the image of the movement is consistently negative. This negative interpretation is summarized in the text on the back-cover of the novel, which ostentatiously directs the readers' attention to atrocities and scandal:

> The Silver Ark is the fifth book by the Sjöström brothers. It is about religious ecstasy followed by nude dancing and group-sex in isolated villages in Norrland during the time of the Korpela movement. The ecstatic movement spread like a plague. There were many tragedies. People gave away their homesteads and assigned away bankbooks when waiting for the ark that was to take them to heavenly bliss. Some eighty persons—most of them women—were prosecuted for immoral behaviour. (My translation.)

Lundmark describes *Silverarken* as a novel which "uncritically passes on the grossest cock-and-bull stories" about the Korpela movement (Lundmark 1985: 24, my translation). It is obvious from the marketing of the novel that aspects of the movement that may seem scandalous to a general reading public are particularly foregrounded, that rumours are passed on and that exaggerations, which enhance the spectacular qualities of the subject matter, are deployed. For example there is no support for the information that "some eighty persons [. . .] were prosecuted" in Lundmark's study. According to him 118 followers were interrogated. Of these 45 persons were sentenced to pay fines (Lundmark 1985: 64).

One of the narrators and focalizers in *Silverarken* is a man whose wife joins the movement against his will. At the end of the novel he has lost his family and traditional way of living. According to Henning and Ernst Sjöström the narrative of the Korpela movement is a story about insanity, foolishness, lusts unleashed, excessive drinking, promiscuity and illicit sex. Normality and reason are represented by the police and various authorities, as well as the righteous farmer-narrator and focalizer, whose life is shattered. The most zealous followers are represented as an irrational, unhealthy threat to normal society. Toivo Korpela is mentioned a couple of times but he is not one of the major characters and he does not play any role in the action, other than that of a man who prior to the beginning of the plot had contributed to starting something which he later had no influence or control over.

In the reception of *Silverarken*, opinions varied with regard to the truth-value of the novel. Some reviewers, as the one in the evening paper *Expressen*, naively professed a belief in the novel's truthfulness. According to *Expressen*'s reviewer this is proved by the correspondence between the novel's representation and reports in contemporary newspaper articles—a most surprising conclusion considering the sensationalism and bias of contemporary newspaper material. The reviewer particularly mentions that the Sjöström brothers had had access to police reports, interviews with witnesses and trial protocols, that is to a large extent the same material which Lennart Lundmark used in his study.[14] However, Lundmark particularly mentions that it had not been possible to interview people who had memories of their own of the movement, as "their time as Korpelians ['korpelaner'] was too much imbued with shame and defeat for them to speak about it" (Lundmark 1985: 8, my translation). With this as a backdrop it seems unlikely that the Sjöström brothers would have succeeded in interviewing people who were directly involved. Thus it is directly misleading when it is stated in one article that Ernst Sjöström spent three years collecting material through interviews and other sources.[15] This kind of information creates the illusion that the Sjöström brothers' novel is factual and truthful by documenting what really happened, while on the contrary it is extremely speculative. This is reflected already in the title of one review which reads: "They got drunk, danced and made love in our most astonishing religious revival" (my translation).[16]

Other reviewers are less impressed by the documentary aspirations of the novel. One concludes, "[o]f course the Sjöström brothers' novel is a speculation in pornography."[17] Several reviewers make comparisons between the sexual practices of the Korpela movement and those of the sex liberal nineteen-sixties. One concludes, "[t]here is nothing new about group-sex."[18] In remarks like this there is a conflation of the cultural context at the time of publication and that of the time when the Korpela movement attracted followers in the nineteen-thirties.

Toivo Korpela and the Korpela Movement in the Fictions of Bengt Pohjanen

During the last few decades Bengt Pohjanen has played a major role in the ethnic, cultural and linguistic revival of the Tornedalian Finnish population. This includes the construction of an imaginary community with a history of its own (Heith 2007; Heith 2008a; Heith 2008b). One element of this history is the vision of a prophetic belt stretching from Bodø in Norway in the west to Narjan Mar in Russia in the east (Pohjanen 2000: 55). This belt covers the imaginary—and in some respects real—homeland, called *Meän-*

maa (literally 'our land'), of the Tornedalian Finns. The Finnish preacher Toivo Korpela is one of the prophets of this area who Bengt Pohjanen has repeatedly reflected upon in various discourses.

In Bengt Pohjanen's use of the historical subject matter concerning the Korpela movement Toivi Korpela plays a much more prominent and complex role than in the Sjöström brothers' novel. In the experimental novels *Korpelan enkelit* ['Korpela's angels'] (1989) in Finnish and *Dagning; röd!* ['Daybreak; red!'] (1992) in Swedish, one plot line consists of a quest made by authors who in the nineteen-eighties seek some kind of truth about Toivo Korpela. They travel to his place of birth Ähtäri in Finland where he also ended his days. They interview people and listen to various contradictory stories about what Toivo Korpela was like. Like the enigmatic Kurtz in Joseph Conrad's novel *Heart of Darkness*, Korpela is surrounded by stories and gossip. As works of art the novels are extremely meta-fictional with ample comments about representation, reality and the novel. The compositions are deliberately complex, rigorously avoiding that of a single thread narrative. Major themes include an examination of the nature of man and the transgression and deconstruction of limits imposed by a rational mode of experiencing. These themes are explored against the backdrop of the Swedish welfare state in which religious fervour and ecstasy represent otherness compared to the "normality" envisioned in the master narrative of modern society. The critique that imbues Pohjanen's novels implies an alternative vision of man as a conglomerate of rational and non-rational drives. On the one hand there is the welfare state's modernist vision of man and, on the other, an alternative account, which does not encompass the notion of man as exclusively rational. This latter view has been propagated by an author whom Pohjanen frequently refers to, namely Dostoyevsky. Particularly Dostoyevsky's *Notes from Underground* (1864) with its critique of modernity and the view of man as a rational being is interesting as a subtext to Pohjanen's own critique. Like Dostoyevsky, Pohjanen is critical of utopian visions of a future Crystal Palace where mathematical precision reigns. With this as a backdrop the vision of a prophetic belt offers an alternative space. It is significant that the seekers and investigators of the novels do not find a final answer when it comes to the nature of Toivo Korpela, who emerges more like the battle field for multiple and contradictory forces than a predictable, rationally comprehensible formula.

In a later short novel in Swedish, *Kristallarken* ['The crystal ark'] (1998), an alternative rationale for the interpretation of the Korpela movement is presented. When it comes to the way it is narrated and composed, this novel is less complex and experimental than the previous *Korpelan enkelit* and *Dagning; röd!* It is narrated in the first person by a narrator who looks

back upon a time when the laws and habits of the everyday ordinary world lost their function as checks for desires and excesses. The narrator explicitly states that he did not believe in the preachings of the prophet of the doomsday sect which emerged in the wake of Toivo Korpela's preachings, but still he participated in the overthrowing of rules and restrictions which regulated sexual practices and what was considered as responsible, decent behaviour in the village community. The theme of this short novel is that of the joyful, burlesque popular carnival which for a period allowed the poor villagers to feel free from limitations that made their life restricted. Indirectly it also tells a story of the harsh conditions and longings of the people. The terms "being free" and "freedom" are frequently mentioned in the religious idiom used by the movement when referring to the imminent prospect of becoming free from wordly matters when the world perishes. The theme of freedom is of course central both to the religious discourse and to the political discourses that competed with the Laestadian revivalism and the Korpela movement for followers.

Trevliga djävlar ['Nice devils'], published in 2003 in Swedish, is still another novel where Pohjanen uses material about Toivo Korpela and the Korpela movement. The narrative levels shift as does the time of the story, from the present day with satellites in the sky till the early twentieth century and the nineteen-thirties. The present-day narrator looks back upon his youth when friends and a relative of his miraculously survived when the Titanic sank and on the nineteen-thirties when another ark was expected by the Korpelians. At the time of narration the narrator is an aged man with grandchildren who live in the south. The early twentieth century is described as a time of change caused by modernity and political and social turbulence. In the Torne Valley of the nineteen-thirties the fascist Lappo movement and communists were competing for followers. The new time is described as an upheaval with dreams of utopian worlds

> where there were no borders between spirit and flesh, reality and fantasy, man and God. There were strange ideas about mercy without limits and heretical teachings that the soul of man could not be stained by any fleshly sin (Pohjanen 2003: 59, my translation).

Toivo Korpela is mentioned as one of the prophets of the new time who contributed to heretical teachings that led people astray. The major theme of the novel is the change of the traditional Tornedalian society caused by modernity, and the religious and political turbulence of the nineteen-thirties. In the narrator's story about this particular historical context there are several false prophets whose followers are ruined, such as modernity, represented by the Titanic, fascism, Stalin, and Korpela.

Branding the Korpela Movement in Cyberspace

Pohjanen's novels *Korpelan enkelit*, *Dagning; röd!*, *Kristallarken* and *Trevliga djävlar* contribute to shaping a particular Tornedalian literary landscape. This landscape was foregrounded in an article published in one of the major Swedish newspapers in 2003. The article is quoted on Pohjanen's website on the Internet, where he has created a new space for the construction of an imaginary community for the Tornedalian Finns.[19] The article mentions Bengt Pohjanen's Torne Valley as one of the cultural treasures that may be found in Swedish literature. When appropriated by Pohjanen this statement becomes part of a new strand in the construction of an imagined community, namely the use of literature in a combination of region-building and the marketing of attractions for visitors. Bengt Pohjanen's Torne Valley is branded as one of the exciting destinations in 2009 which is said to "blow up borders" (my translation).[20] One of the attractions is described under the title "Korpelarörelsen." The text tells the reader that "[t]he master narrator Bengt Pohjanen is happy to tell the breath-taking and enigmatic story about the Korpela movement" (my translation). It is accompanied by a photograph showing Pohjanen standing in a dark wood in the process of telling the story to an attentive audience. From a rhetorical perspective the choice of the words "breath-taking" ['hisnande'] and "enigmatic" ['gåtfull'] to characterize the movement is congenial with the vision of the prophetic belt which constitutes a space where prophets of various brands may partake in a drama of revolt against the anthropology of Western modernity rooted in Enlightenment rationalism. This theme is not elaborated in the branding and marketing of the oral performance, but it is part of the intertext that provides Bengt Pohjanen's use of the material with a specific significance.

Writing the Nation

The examples of a novel by the Sjöström brothers and the texts by Bengt Pohjanen display a contrasting way of deploying historical material in fiction. The implications of this may be interpreted within the framework of theories that analyze the writing of the modern nation in the form of the novel. One such theory is proposed by Homi K. Bhabha in the postcolonial classic *The Location of Culture* (Bhabha 2008). Bhabha elaborates two ways of assessing time in literary narratives and their implications for the understanding of categories like "the people" and "history." He is critical of the kind of historicism which proposes a linear equivalence of events and ideas and which also implies that a people, a nation, or a national culture are seen as empirical social categories or holistic cultural entities (Bhabha 2008: 201). One of Bhabha's major points is that the nation is a highly ambivalent

category which may be seen as a narrative strategy and that the narrative and psychological force of nationness influences both cultural production and political projection. Quoting Said he criticizes beliefs in single explanations and single origins. Bhabha's critique furthermore foregrounds the complicity between modern nationalism and Enlightenment universalism, which requires an idea of the Other in order to sustain its universalistic claims (Bhabha 2008: 203). Two major points made are that the boundaries of modernity are problematic and that a historiographic fixation on them in narratives of the modern nation have tended to highlight homogeneity.

In the representation of the nation as a temporal process Bhabha also discerns a nationalist pedagogy which implies that the narrative of the nation embraces a teleology of progress. As a complement to this he discerns another model. This is called the model of a "'timeless' discourse of irrationality" and it implies a questioning of the metaphors of progressive modern social cohesion (Bhabha 2008: 204). Of course the metaphors and narrative models of progress, continuity and cohesion that imbue the narration of modern Western nations have not emerged without contestation. On the contrary Bhabha emphasizes the element of narrative struggle that produces the origin of the nation. The main argument of this article is that the Sjöström brothers' and Bengt Pohjanen's deployment of material about the Korpela movement represent two distinct ways of negotiating the content of modernity and the identity of the nation. Bhabha goes on pointing out that:

> In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of *writing the nation* (Bhabha 2008: 209).

In highlighting the performative aspects of narrating the nation in the present, Bhabha proposes the strategy of reading between the borderlines of nation-space in order to see how the concept of the "people" emerges within a range of discourses as a double narrative movement. The people are both the historical "objects" of a nationalist pedagogy and:

> the 'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity as that sign of the *present* through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process (Bhabha 2008: 208).

Summing up

On the one hand the novels discussed above exemplify a presentation of a teleological, progressive narrative about the people and the nation, and on the other a double narrative movement which includes "a 'timeless' discourse of irrationality." I propose that the novel by the Sjöström brothers is based on the notion of the state as a cohesive entity founded on the legacy of Enlightenment universalism and rationalism. Pohjanen's texts, on the other hand, display a performative positioning as a subject in a process of signification, which destabilizes and deconstructs the narration of homogeneity and linear progress. The spatial metaphor for this alternative is the vision of a prophetic belt stretching from Bodø in Norway to Narjan Mar in Russia. Among the prophets of this belt are Toivo Korpela and the initiators of the Korpela movement. In this alternative narrative of the nation and the people, these are agents both in the story of the emerging modern welfare state and in the plot of the "'timeless' discourse of irrationality." This makes visible the split in the production of the nation as narration between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the modern Swedish welfare state and the performative subversion of an alternative logic which is also claimed to be representative.

NOTES

[1] The poem "Jag är född utan språk" is reproduced in Swedish on the first page of Bengt Pohjanen's and Eeva Muli's Meänkieli grammar book (Pohjanen & Muli 2005). *Meänkieli* literally means 'our language.'

[2] And from the time that the daily sacrifice shall be taken away, and the abomination that maketh desolate set up, there shall be a thousand two hundred and ninety days. Blessed is he that waiteth, and cometh to the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days" (*Book of Daniel* 12: 11–12).

[3] "And they heard a great voice from heaven saying unto them, Come up hither. And they ascended to heaven in a cloud; and their enemies beheld them" (*Revelation* 11: 12). "And the nations were angry, and thy wrath is come, and the time of the dead, that they should be judged, and that thou shouldest give reward unto thy servants the prophets, and to the saints, and them that fear thy name, small and great; and shouldest destroy them which destroy the earth. And the temple of God was opened in heaven, and there was seen in his temple the ark of his testament: and there were lightnings, and voices, and thunderings, and an earthquake, and great hail" (*Revelation* 11: 18–19).

[4] Laestadianism is a Nordic religious revivalist movement which bears the name of its founder Lars Levi Laestadius (1800–1861). A concise account of the movement and its founder is presented in Kulonen, Seurajärvi-Kari & Pulkkinen (2005: 167–170).

[5] Among other works Lundmark refers to Vittorio Lanternari's study *The Religions of the Oppressed. A Study of Modern Messianic Cults*. This study is interesting as a backdrop to an analysis of the Korpela movement although Lanternari's study deals solely with "ethnological civilizations, with [...] economic and technological backwardness [...]. These

ancient and prehistoric cultures are the roots of our present Western civilization, which, despite the growth and progress of centuries, in many cases has retained some of the early elements found in folklore, in popular superstitions and taboos" (Lanternari 1963: vi). My point is that there is no clear division between the modern Western civilization on the one hand and "ethnological," "prehistoric" cultures on the other, as elements from these are included in cultural practices involving hybridisation and syncretism in (post)modern postwestern cultures.

[6] In August 2008 I had the opportunity to stay a week at the Sigtuna Foundation, Sweden. During this time I had access to their archives with newspaper articles about the Korpela movement.

[7] In a forthcoming article I discuss the work of Bengt Pohjanen within the theoretical framework of contemporary postcolonial critique.

[8] All subsequent references to contemporary newspaper articles refer to material from the Sigtuna Foundation's archives if no other reference is mentioned.

[9] "Lärarinna säger upp sig för att flyga med kristallarken" ['Woman teacher resigns in order to fly with the crystal ark'], unsigned article in *Aftonbladet* 10 March 1935.

[10] "Flygande arkens profet ännu vid 25 års ålder – analfabet! Predikade över bibeltexter, som andra måste uppläsa. —Klara bevis på Sverigeturnéernas lukrativitet" ['The prophet of the flying ark still an illiterate at the age of 25! Preached over Bible texts others had to read. —Clear proofs of the profitability of the tours to Sweden'], the Haparanda correspondent of *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* 22 March 1935.

[11] "Från AB:s utsände: På ett Korpela-möte i Kiruna. Entonigt rabblande på finska från middag till kväll" ['From the correspondent of AB: At a Korpela meeting in Kiruna. Monotonous babbling in Finnish from noon till night'], the signature Koski, *Aftonbladet* 20 March 1935.

[12] "Ännu trollas det ibland mot sjukdom i Lappland" ['Still witchcraft is sometimes used against illness in Lapland'], the signature Kråkberg, *Dagens Nyheter* 31 March 1935.

[13] This is discussed in my forthcoming article.

[14] "Bröderna Sjöström ger ut bok om religiöst vanvett" [The Sjöström brothers publish book on religious madness'], Sussie Bjuvstedt, *Expressen* 20 October 1969.

[15] "De söp, dansade och älskade i vår märkligaste religiösa väckelse" ['They got drunk, danced, and made love in our most astonishing religious revival'], Göran Palm, *Göteborgsposten* 12 October 1969.

[16] Ibid.

[17] "Den religiösa extasen" ['The religious ecstacy'], Lars Hamberg, *Hufvudstadsbladet* 4 December 1969.

[18] "Sexorgier var ritual vid Korpelas bönemöten" ['Sex orgies were ritual at Korpela's prayer-meetings'], Bo Degerman, *Dalademokraten* 30 October 1969.

[19] "The great provinces of Swedish literature are a too seldom mentioned cultural treasure. Gunnar D Hansson's Swedish west coast, Walter Ljungquist's province of Östergötland, Strindberg's Stockholm archipelago, Lars Gustafsson's province Västmanland, Bengt Pohjanen's Torne Valley, Birgitta Trotzig's Skåne plain..." (my translation; quoted from Bengt Pohjanen's webpage http://www.sirillus.se/index_bp.htm; access date 19 November 2008). The article was written by Ulf Eriksson and published in *Göteborgsposten* 31 July 2003.

[20] "Spännande resmål 2009" ['Exciting destinations in 2009']; http://www.sirillus.se/index_bp.htm; access date 19 November 2008.

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ANASTASIA ROGOVA

"Chicken Is Not a Bird—Kirkenes Is Not Abroad"

Borders and Territories in the Perception of the Population in a Russian-Norwegian Borderland

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the Russian-Norwegian borderland and its development in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the border was opened for communication in both ways, and since then its meaning has undergone significant changes that have reshaped the whole territory. My argument is that there are nowadays a considerable number of people in the borderland whose "own" territory is not limited any more by the state border, but includes both Russian and Norwegian territories as parts of a unified personal space, which is neither Russia, nor Norway to the full extent. Practical, operative space has expanded for the local people who actively use border-related resources in their everyday life. Local identity has changed, and the broadening of operative space has led to the formation of new life strategies and social mobility in the region. The idea of a unified cross-border space is now implemented both on the individual level, as a result of extensive cross-border contacts, and on the level of political and administrative decisions and official discourses. Furthermore, political and cultural elites of the region are actively constructing the concept of the Euro-Arctic Barents Region as an identity region.

KEYWORDS Russian-Norwegian borderland, Barents region, borders, local identity, immigration

Introduction

Borders of "own" territory exist wherever human beings live. They can differ in scale and in nature: we can talk about the borders of the state,

region, district, neighbourhood; borders of one's apartment or a room; borders of a village, a city, a community, a courtyard, or a farm. Borders can be administratively established, or be part of tradition. As for the Russian-Norwegian borderland, there is a state border that shapes the national territories, but there are also other borders there: cultural, psychological, or symbolic ones. All of them influence local identity and social practices of the inhabitants.

The article focuses on the formation and functions of the borders in the region, which is conventionally called the Russian-Norwegian borderland, as well as on their influence on everyday life and attitudes of local people. It will also deal with how inhabitants of the borderland today comprehend "their own" territory, where they set its limits, and what meaning they give to the state border between Norway and Russia. Of course, there are two different stories at the two sides of the border that are interdependent but require individual attention. This article places the major emphasis on the Russian population of the borderland.

The notion of border is also closely interrelated with the idea of local, or regional identity, which is an important aspect of social identity and implies personal feeling of belonging to a place or territory occupied by the group. This local identity is not fixed in time or space, as territories are not eternal, and borders are subject to change (Paasi 2007: 29). Political boundaries can contribute significantly to where psychological boundaries are drawn (Llamas 2007: 582), but they are not the only factor. The borders of what is perceived as one's "own" place can shift depending on various aspects of inter-group relations, everyday practices, cultural and linguistic patterns, and official discourse.

Data Collection

The article is based on empirical material collected during fieldwork in Kirkenes, Norway, and Murmansk, Russia, in 2006–2008. Fieldwork in Kirkenes was arranged twice in 2006 and 2007 with the support of the Barents Institute, and once in Murmansk in 2008. The whole period of work took four months. The major type of material that I use in the article is semi-structured interviews with Russians living in Murmansk and regularly travelling across the border, and with Russians and Norwegians living in Kirkenes. All interviews were held in either Russian or Norwegian, and the abstracts used in the article were translated into English by the author. Another type of material that I resort to consists of documents, including Russian and Norwegian local newspapers and web-publications.

History of the Borderland

The Russian-Norwegian borderland, which is the object of the present research, is a rather new phenomenon, though this border has existed for a long time. Until the twentieth century the region had been only sparsely populated, and when the border between Norway and Russia was set in 1826, the population of the Norwegian municipality of Sør-Varanger consisted of only 290 people (Wikan 1980: 31). The Russian part of the Russian-Norwegian borderland also remained sparsely populated until the First World War, when the construction of Murmansk railway was started in 1914 and Murmansk was founded in 1916. Soon after that, in 1920, after Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Peace treaty of Tartu, the Petsamo region and adjacent territories up to the coast of the Barents Sea became Finnish territory. As a result, Norway and Russia did not share a common border until 1944, when the territory that belonged to Finland since 1920, became again a part of the Soviet Union. During all this period the border between Finland and the Soviet Union and then Norway and the Soviet Union was closed, which made cross-border communication impossible. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the communication across the border became possible, a new period of Russian-Norwegian cross-border contacts started and from here on it is possible to discuss the contemporary stage of relations and the formation of the Russian-Norwegian borderland, understood as a territory located near the state border and characterized by interaction between its inhabitants and by cultural and economic exchange between them.

The question of borders and territories in the Russian-Norwegian borderland is especially important today, since their meaning and role have undergone dramatic changes since the early 1990s. For decades, the border between the Soviet Union and Norway had been a symbolic end of the world for people living on the two sides of it, which was typical of any Soviet border (Brednikova & Voronkov 1999). Their practical experience very rarely expanded beyond this border, which clearly set the limits of their "own" space. The situation started to change after the Soviet Union collapsed and it became much easier to cross the border. The perception of the border and attitudes towards it shared by some groups of the local population have been transformed in the process of crossing the border and developing the territory on the other, "strange," side of it, which has resulted in the formation of a new space, which we call the Russian-Norwegian borderland, and which is neither Russia nor Norway to the full extent.

This space is not equally important to all inhabitants of the territory. Important criteria of the formation of various social communities in the borderland are the individuals' attitudes towards the border, the choice of certain strategies of life that include or do not include the border, use or

do not use border related resources (Brednikova & Voronkov 1999). These choices lead to the formation of a personal space that can differ from one social community to another. There are two co-existing levels of space in the Russian-Norwegian border territories: (1) independent Russian and Norwegian territories, lying close to the border but clearly separated, (2) a new space (*borderland*) that includes western parts of the Murmansk region in Russia and Sør-Varanger municipality in Norway. These two levels of space exist simultaneously and their actualization depends on individual attitudes to the border and personal everyday practices. It is the second level of the space, *the borderland*, that is the main focus of the present article, and the aim is to prove that it really does exist, and to show how its existence influences the everyday life of people.

The Borderland since 1991

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, changes that took place affected people living on both sides of the border. First of all, it resulted in a change of the social space, its enlargement for both Norwegians and Russians who started developing the territory that had been previously closed to them.

These first contacts across the border were usually chaotic, and often illegal, or on the verge of being legal, leading to mutual ethnic stigmatization and conflicts. While Russian and Norwegian authorities and politicians were establishing cooperation, idealizing common history and discussing a bright common future, people in the borderland faced a new reality that they had to adjust their lives to.

The 1990s were characterized by large social and economic crises in Russia, and the Russian-Norwegian border was marked at that time by a large socio-economic gap, which made the border an important economic resource for the local people. The usage of the border as a resource is common for a lot of border regions (see, for example, Brednikova & Voronkov 1999), and crossing the border to sell some goods for a better price or buy cheaper products or services also became a usual practice for the Russian-Norwegian borderland. After the border was opened, the first people to develop the new territory were various "traders." There were street vendors who sold goods of every sort and kind in the streets, smugglers who illegally sold vodka and cigarettes, and prostitutes.

Active street sales started in Northern Norway in 1992, when over 30,000 Russians visited Norway (61,191 border crossings both ways). The peak of the visits fell on September and October 1992. Russian who came to Norway sold various goods from matreshka dolls to Soviet army symbols, cut-glass ware, linen, etc. They were selling their goods just in the streets of towns. At first this trade attracted interest from the local people, but soon



Fig. 1. Number of border crossings at Storskog by Russian citizens (the data provided by The Norwegian Border Commissioner in Sør-Varanger).

its scope and negative consequences caused resentment. Already in November 1992 Norwegian authorities made an attempt to stop the street trade and the flow of Russians to Norway. The police department in Sør-Varanger municipality announced that the street trade was forbidden unless vendors had obtained a special license. This announcement was also published in some local newspapers in the Murmansk region. This new regulation led to a sharp decrease in the number of Russians coming to Norway through the Storskog border station: there were over 12,000 border crossings in October, and already in November the figures dropped down to only 4,000, while in December they decreased to as low as 2,000.

At the same time, during the autumn of 1992, a show trial for drug smuggling was organized against Igor Zadorozhny from Murmansk. The trial got a broad coverage in both Russian and Norwegian mass media. Zadorozhny's barrister accused the Norwegian mass media of using the trial for the spread of the "anti-Russian campaign." He said, in particular:

> One of the arguments against Russian tourism was the following: The Russian mafia brings drugs to Norway. They needed this trial as a confirmation. During the four months that Igor was held in their prison, local mass media were making good use of the situation (*Polyarnaya Pravda*, 2 December 1992, my translation).

Nevertheless, this does not mean that illegal trade stopped at that moment. Here is the fragment of an interview with a Russian woman living in Murmansk:

Respondent: I started going to Norway in September 1994 and went there every week.
Interviewer: Why did you go there?
Respondent: To sell alcohol and some souvenirs, though it was forbidden. All groups went there to sell alcohol, first of all. (Interview with a Russian woman, field diary 2008.)

For some people in Murmansk, the opportunity to go to Norway and earn money there in one way or another was the only source of income and maintenance of the family in the 1990s.

> Norway maintained us. We survived owing to it. Went there with all these vodka bottles... There was competition, I must say! [...] My son was 5 years old then, and I can now say that we survived because I sold these bottles in Norway. If I could get 2,000 Norwegian krones, it was 8,000 roubles, and you could really live on that money then. (Interview with a Russian woman, field diary 2008.)

Another aspect of the cross-border contacts of the 1990s, closely related to the smuggling and illegal trade, was so-called Russian prostitution in Finnmark. Russians who came to Finnmark at that time were mainly women, and their trips were organized by travel agencies, who brought them for weekends to various camping places situated in the proximity of the border. The situation was probably more complicated than it is usually labelled as prostitution. These groups consisted of various women and represented a mixture of trade, smuggling, prostitution, as well as looking for a man to get married, or genuine tourism. Nevertheless, those women who came to these weekend trips were generally perceived as prostitutes by the local Norwegian population and were similarly presented in the Norwegian mass media. The year 1997 saw an extensive growth of attention to this problem in the national media after some spontaneous demonstrations against Russian prostitution were organized at that time in several towns in Northern Norway (Stenvoll 2002: 147). These camping trips ceased soon after 2000, but the problem of prostitution and illegal alcohol selling did not disappear at that point as well, but has become less conspicuous and topical in the public sphere.

It was also in the early 1990s that the first Russians settled down in Kirkenes. The first Russians came there as specialists who had obtained a job there. They also brought in their families. In the course of several years, the number of Russians living in Kirkenes increased significantly (see Fig 2).

Russian trade, tourism, and immigration led to a change of the meaning of the border. It is possible to say that the state border between Russia

Fig. 2. Increase in the Russian population in Sør-Varanger municipality, Norway (*Sør-Varanger Avis*, Snart Helg, 5 May 2008, p. 5, with the reference to Statistics Norway).

and Norway does not mean the end of their "own" space for people living close to it anymore, and crossing the border does not mean leaving a familiar place and encountering a strange environment. Practical, operative space has expanded for the local population who actively use border-related resources.

For the people living in Murmansk and the Murmansk region, their "own" space includes today Kirkenes, or, more precisely, its "Russian" part, which has several unofficial Russian names, the most popular one probably being *Kirsanovka* (it sounds like a typical name of a small place in Russia). We can reconstruct this change in the perception of space on the basis of the analysis of everyday practices of people and the popular discourse about the state border. Kirkenes is the place where people from Murmansk go several times a year for shopping, because prices there are lower and the quality of goods is better (at least for those who really believe in it). In addition, Kirkenes is a kind of transport point. People use the airport of Kirkenes to go for vacations or business trips. This route is considered as a faster, cheaper and more comfortable one than the way via Moscow or St. Petersburg. International cooperation is mostly concentrated to Kirkenes as well, and various meetings and negotiations take place there due to the geographical proximity of the town to the Russian border.

Thus, it is obvious that Kirkenes is not part of a foreign territory for people in Murmansk today. A popular joke that one can hear in Murmansk says that "chicken is not a bird—Kirkenes is not abroad," and in recent years it also reflects the real developments. In a 1999 Murmansk newspaper arti-

cle, a journalist writes about some conflicts between Russians and Norwegians, and ends the article with the following words:

> We are destined if not to love each other, but at least to be tolerant and friendly to each other. After all, Kirkenes is not a foreign place to us in Murmansk, and Murmansk is a close city to those who live in Kirkenes (*Polyarnaya pravda*, 3 November 1999, my translation).

Several interviews that I have taken in Murmansk confirm this statement:

> If you have been to Kirkenes, you have been abroad, in Norway, if you look at the map. But... there are so many Russians there, and you do not feel that you are abroad. You use another currency, cross the border, and go through all these formalities, but you still do not have a feeling of being abroad. You feel at home there. (Interview with a Russian woman, Murmansk, 2008.)

> Kirkenes has got a new name already: *Kirsanovka* or *Kirik*. It is a kind of a small Russian village. We have there the Kirkenes Center, a shopping mall. But everyone calls it *Volna*. Everyone says: "Let's go to the Volna, buy some food," for example, because we have a shopping mall here in Murmansk that is called *Volna*. There are very many such things that are Norwegian originally but Russians perceive them as something of their "own." (Interview with a Russian woman, Murmansk, 2008.)

The changes in the perception of space can also be traced by the analysis of acculturation patterns chosen by Russian settled in Kirkenes. Interviews and previous research works provide the basis for the assumption that Russians who moved to Kirkenes in the 1990s perceived themselves as immigrants and arranged their lives accordingly; they were mainly oriented towards local values and strove for assimilation into Norwegian society. A lot of Russian women spoke Norwegian to their children and declined to have a Russian assistant for their children at kindergarten, and they turned down the right of their children to receive instruction in their mother tongue at school.

This strategy of behaviour became apparent in all everyday practices, rather than only in the language choice. A Russian journalist describes her impressions of Kirkenes in 1993:

> I have later met some Russian women who left Russia some time ago in the firm belief that they would get happily married there. They all had this watchful look, unwillingness to keep in touch with other Russians, and the desire to merge with the crowd and be as invisible as possible.

> [...] One evening I noticed one of the Kirkenes Russian wives in the central street of the town. She rocked the pram in the company of some Norwegian mums and was telling something to them, obviously not in Russian. I waved my hand to her, but got only a slight nod back. She did not want to demonstrate her Russian origin once more before her new friends (*Komsomolets Zapolyariya*, 24 July 1993, my translation).

In 2001, the Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet*[1] published an article about Kirkenes, titled "Lille Murmansk" ['Little Murmansk']. This article included an interview with a Russian woman who had lived in Kirkenes for six years:

> I never speak Russian with Isabel Monica [her daughter], even when we are alone. I always speak Norwegian. It would be stupid to live in a Russian way in Kirkenes. My daughter has Norwegian friends and she watches Norwegian programmes on TV (*Dagbladet*, 28 October 2001, my translation).

These days it is still possible to observe this way of life in Kirkenes, but it has become much less typical. Russians in Kirkenes prefer today to choose other cultural strategies. One of the key definitions of the way of life of Russians in Kirkenes—"they live as if they were still in Russia:" they watch Russian TV, read Russian books, eat Russian food, and communicate mainly with their Russian friends. Unlike in typical immigrant communities, this type of behaviour is focused not on the closed immigrant community itself, but rather on Russia as a whole, which is revealed in various aspects of everyday life. Russians who leave for Kirkenes do not destroy their social networks in their mother land, they retain them and even broaden them by new contacts they get in Kirkenes. Some of them live in Kirkenes, but go to Russia every weekend to see their families and friends. Others wait for these trips "home" in order to visit a doctor or a hairdresser. One woman said about her son who went to high school in Kirkenes, and was also working there, that he was in Murmansk almost every weekend: "He says that he earns money in Kirkenes to go to bars and discos in Murmansk." Some of the Russians prefer to stay in Kirkenes and not to move, for example, to Oslo or some other larger cities, only because of its proximity to Russia.

These changes in the perception of space and importance of borders affect and even shape the local identities of people. Today, immigration from Murmansk to Kirkenes does not mean immigration in the real sense of the word. I would argue that a lot of Russians who live in Kirkenes today do not perceive themselves as immigrants, because Kirkenes does not exceed the bounds of the territory that people in Murmansk can comprehend as their own territory, and it is not certain that it is a "strange" territory, as, for example, Oslo or even Tromsø certainly are.

From Borderland to the Barents Region

The idea of a unified cross-border space in the region is being realized not only on the individual level, but, first of all, on the level of political and administrative decisions and official discourses. In other words, it is actively constructed by political and cultural elites.

The borders of what is perceived as one's "own" space can shift depending on various aspects of inter-group relations. When people experience the changes of the space they are used to accept as their "own," they are likely to establish new borders. In the case of the Russian-Norwegian borderland, there is a good alternative, created by political will, that is the Euro-Arctic Barents region. This project, started some 15 years ago, attempted to create a new space, in which the periphery becomes the centre, and the meaningful psychological and symbolic borders move from the state of Russia, which had been a threat and the end of the "normal" world for decades, to the regional borders within several states. The Barents region has offered people a new space, a new local identity, and a new image of "the other."

From the very beginning the Barents region was planned by the Norwegian authorities as an identity region, which can be defined as "an area where the population has a specific awareness of *us* inside the region, as opposed to *them* outside" (Hønneland 1998: 279). This strategy appears first of all in the political and administrative decisions and in the official discourse. There are a lot of projects that use the name of the Barents region. We can read about the "Barents jazz area," or "Barents TV." The latter one is especially interesting:

> The project team is going to talk about the Barents Region in its cultural, spiritual, emotional entity through the eyes of its inhabitants. [...] the topics of the films would be the major human values and realities of everyday life like love, freedom, music, food, sport, religion, environment, landscapes, children etc. Obviously, the BTV mission is to open the Barents Region in its existing and developing identity to the outer world. But to a much greater extent it may influence the perception of common interests, values and aspirations of the people living in the High North.[2]

It is questionable whether this identity construction project has been successful. On the one hand, the Barents region has become a reality for a group of people. On the other hand, this group is relatively small, and the Barents region is still a vague notion for the majority of its citizens. We can surmise that the idea of the Barents region has gained more popularity in Kirkenes than in Murmansk. At the same time, people living in Murmansk, compared to those living in Kirkenes, use the border resources to a greater

extent in their everyday practices. They do not usually bind these activities with the Barents region concept, but make some of its basic ideas reality.

While the existence of so-called *Barents identity*, widely discussed in some research and public discourse, remains questionable, it is obvious that the opening of the border has changed people's experience and perception of themselves and the surrounding world. The local identity of the borderland population has changed, and the broadening of operative space has led to the formation of new life strategies and social mobility which will influence the development of the local community for years to come.

NOTES

[1] The change in the behaviour of Russians living in Kirkenes can be explained by various reasons. But the major one is, probably, the changes that took place in the perception of place and borders. Russians who came to Kirkenes in the 1990s found themselves in an unknown strange environment. Today the situation is different: the decrease in the psychological importance of the state border led to a change of the symbolic borders of their "own" space.

[2] The Norwegian Barents Secretariat: Barents Discovery in the New Film Series. http://www.barents.no/barents-discovery-in-the-new-film-series-.4466190-41594.html; access date 7 april 2008.

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The Control of the Cultural Borders between the Finns and the Skolt Sami

From Ambivalence to Respect for the Border

ABSTRACT In this article, the control and drawing up of the cultural borders between the Finns and the Skolt Sami are studied. Before the Second World War, as illustrated in the travel book by Sakari Pälsi, the writer as well as the whole state of Finland tried to come to terms with the new "colony" and the new exotic "Other," the Skolt Sami, within the Finnish boundaries. This led to ambivalent relations with both the new citizens of Finland and with the drawing up and control of borders. This was especially the case in crossing the cultural border, where no respect was shown to the guardians of the border, even though this role was paternalistically awarded to them. By the time of the release of the main work by Karl Nickul, the author himself and the state of Finland had come to terms with their "colonial" past. The "good state" was condemned by Nickul, ambivalence was absent and Nickul produced a true post-colonial piece, where the view emanates from the other side of the border, thus completing his personal quest to restore the Skolt Sami agency in research.

KEYWORDS cultural borders, Finns, Skolt Sami, cultural encounter, control of the border, Sakari Pälsi, Karl Nickul

Introduction

I shall discuss the control of the cultural borders in the encounter between Finns and the Skolt Sami during the period of Finnish rule in Petsamo from 1920 to 1944 and after. The borders negotiated by two Finnish scholars, Sakari Pälsi (1882–1965) and Karl Nickul (1900–1980), are studied. I shall concentrate on their negotiations concerning the border, as well as on the ambivalence found in the text by Pälsi and its disappearance in the text by Nickul.

The border has both a textual and a spatial dimension. The borders are drawn in texts through representations between "us" and "them" (Löytty 2005: 8; Newman 2006: 6), but borders have a socially constitutive dimension as well. Behind each border lies a symbolic relation, of which the border is a spatial indication. Not the border in itself, but the cultural and social juxtaposition creates the difference (Simmel [1903] 1997: 141–143). The border is a social relation, a lived experience, an identity and subjectivity. Avtar Brah asks how borders are created, and how they are controlled: who is kept outside, and why (Brah 2007: 89–90)? In a Finnish context one may also ask who is permitted to enter, and under what conditions?

In the most elementary sense, ambivalence means that one can adopt a different approach to, or hold a contradictory opinion about certain phenomena (Kuortti 2007: 19). Homi K. Bhabha writes about the deep-seated uncertainty of the aims, premises and results of the colonial process, where the whole colonial discourse is reduced to the colonial act of strengthening the differences and the national identity, by classifying the subjugated as lower and thus trying to control them. He uses the term ambivalence of the way in which the colonizer unconsciously or consciously acknowledges the similarity between the colonizer and the colonized, which creates tensions within the discourses and opens up the possibility of a more active role for the colonized (Bhabha [1987] 2007: 122–123, 131; Huddart 2007: 65–66). I connect the term *ambivalence* with the discussion concerning the control of the borders by asking whether the cultural borders drawn were respected or whether they were crossed ambivalently, without negotiation. What role was given to the Skolt Sami concerning this control, and was this role respected? More generally, I shall provide a short overview of representations of the Skolt Sami culture when the ethnic and cultural borders were drawn, and how these changed in Finland after the Second World War. I am also going to contextualize the texts to the political discourses of the era.

In this article I make use of border theories presented by the above-mentioned post-colonial theorists. There exists a need to justify their use, due to the marginality of post-colonial perspectives and discussions in Finnish academic and political discourses. The aim is not to write a programmatic,

uncritical post-colonial narrative of this encounter—criticized by Bhabha, for example, as over-simplifying, and missing the opportunity to look into the cultural interaction and colonized agency—but to shed alternative light onto the process (Brah 2007: 81–82, 99; Huddart 2007: 62–63; Kuortti 2007: 14). In addition, the substance of the sources (ambivalence) has guided the choice of theories. I claim that the term is usable in a Finnish context as well, since at the time of writing of Pälsi's work *Petsamoon kuin ulkomaille* (1931), Finland was in the midst of numerous identity discussions. One of these concerned whether Finland was an anti-imperialist state and how this fitted in with the expansionist plans of the state (Airaksinen 2008: passim; Vahtola 1997: 36, 57, 80–81). In Petsamo, a rare colonial moment occurred in a Finnish context, in the encounter with the Skolt Sami, the new citizens of Finland.

In addition, Finland has been characterized as a good example of a unified nation created and constructed in literature. There was a literary project of distinguishing oneself from the Swedish and the Russians, which was a more dominant one than the identity politics that reflected the Finnish against their "weaker brother," the Sami. The Skolt Sami had a special role in the process of writing a nation, since they were among the Finno-Ugrian people who were actually annexed to the Finnish realm through the expansive policies of the young state. This process, not free of racist/colonialist traits, found several textual expressions (Hatavara 2008: 315, 319–320; Lehtola 2005: 49–54, 58; Nyyssönen 2008: 13–27).

The Ethnic Encounter between the Finns and the Skolt Sami

Finnish policies concerning the Skolt Sami are, in their multiplicity, difficult to define—they resulted in an odd mixture of integration, discrimination and highly progressive segregation policy. Already at the time of annexation, the two *siida*s[1] closest to the Finnish settlement, Petsamo and Paatsjoki, were in a process of disintegration, which was escalated by modernization. For the *siida* protected by isolation that practised a semi-autonomous subsistence economy, Suenjel/Suonikylä, there existed segregation, or a "protection" plan, initiated by the Skolt Sami and advocated by Karl Nickul. The war halted this plan, which would have resulted in an area of cultural protection. The most obvious trait, the Finnicization of the region, entertained a curiously selective grip on the Skolt Sami. The integration was not total, which may be partly credited to the racial and discriminating attitudes of the Finnish officials and partly to the defects of the modernization process itself. In the short period of the Finnish rule in Petsamo,

the modernization concerning the infrastructure and welfare services was never finished. There were, for example, defects in access to the Finnish elementary school system and to the itinerant teacher system. Still, the subsistence of the two *siida*s was destroyed in the process, as the Skolt Sami found their access to their traditional fisheries reduced. The Skolt Sami had to seek other, very often occasional sources of employment/subsistence (Lehtola 1999a: 149–153; Nyyssönen 2006: 201–205; Pelto 1962: 30).

In travel literature, Petsamo was represented as finding itself on the borderline between wilderness and civilization, as the Finns entered the "new continent" with the modernization of the region in mind. It was standard practice to write simultaneously about wild, untouched nature and express firm belief in modernization and progress, and to depict Petsamo as an industrialized and modern part of Finland. This progress was identified and ethnicified to the Finnish realm in multicultural Petsamo. The multiculturality of the region was a problem for many Finnish writers, who aimed to construct a monolingual and "mononational" Petsamo. The Finnish settlers were in the midst of a heroic struggle against the "chaos," which was linked to the Russian people and the Skolt Sami living in the region (Lehtola 1999b: 519–522).

The experiences with and depictions of the Skolt Sami were in most cases negative and superficial. In Finnish travel literature, the Skolt Sami were typically represented as "known from their witchcraft and yoik" and one was able to meet them in the "original condition" (Lehtola 1999b: 517). The Skolt Sami were encapsulated deeper within primordialized and exoticized "otherness" than, for example, other Sami groups encountered within the Finnish borders. At worst, the Skolt Sami were represented as lazy, stupid and primitive, and their way of life as suffering from defects and being worse than the Finnish. The image of a work-shy reindeer thief was a constant. The Skolt Sami were racialized to the Russian and communist spheres, the great enemy of Finland before the Second World War. The religious border deepened the national and cultural one: the Skolt Sami practised the Orthodox faith, which was categorized as lower than the Lutheran faith practised by the majority of Finns (Lehtola 2005: 51–53, 57–58).

Pälsi Travels Abroad without Leaving Finland

Sakari Pälsi was an archaeologist, ethnographer, explorer and author who worked at the National Museum of Finland (*Biografiakeskus*). The title of his travel book, *Petsamoon kuin ulkomaille*, is difficult to translate, but literally it means "Going to Petsamo as if it was abroad." Despite this, the book is a landmark of Finnish ambivalence in the encounter with the region and its peoples. I shall discuss briefly the borders crossed in Pälsi's work, before going into the ambivalence concerning the borders.

In travelling from the centre to the periphery one has to cross a mental border, very often from civilization to the wilderness. Pälsi travelled with his wife from Helsinki to the Arctic Ocean and back. The first border that Pälsi crossed was a natural border, as he travelled from "vilja-Suomi" ('grain-Finland') to the more barren, treeless landscapes of Lapland, *Terra Ultima* in a Finnish context, and on to Petsamo, thus demonstrating the dissemination of the borders, how they are spread along the journey and how their crossing is partially disconnected from geography and place (Schimanski 2008: 20). Pälsi's work is a typical travel book in its way of reflecting mental power relations: Pälsi indeed travels from the centre to "abroad" and to the mystic, non-agrarian and primitive periphery (Varpio 2005: 31, 33, 38). The book ends with a depiction of the grain-fields of Southern Finland. This is intended to mark the difference in the national hierarchies. Finland was at this time still an agrarian nation, where the free peasant living and owning his land in the countryside represented the highest ideal of the Finnish nation and a backbone of society, which would secure the security of the young nation arising from the Civil War of 1918. Pälsi was only capable of perceiving the Finnish as being higher than the Skolt Sami, with their diverse and non-agrarian subsistence economy (Haapala 1997: 77; Meinander 2006: 166–167; Pälsi 1931: 10, 15–16, 29).

Odour constitutes a border as well. The hygienic discourse was a programmatic part of imperialism in many colonies of this period. It was both a physical and mental cleansing process, as well as "a push upwards" from primitiveness higher up in Western parameters and hierarchies. The aim of individualizing the colonial subjects from the primitive slavery of their surroundings was sometimes used as an argument (Adams 1995: 101–102, 112–113, 132–133; Thuesen 2007: 118, 128). This discourse is traceable in Pälsi's writing and he starts his characterizations of the people he meets with observations on that person's hygiene. One almost insurmountable border is encountered when visiting a home of two Skolt Sami. In Skolt Sami subsistence, fishing very often constitutes the main source of nutrition and the coffee served to the travellers in this occasion, reeking of fish, constitutes a border that the travellers manage to cross only with great effort and difficulty, reported in a humorous manner to the reader (Pälsi 1931: 40, 44–45, 72).

Ambivalence is very concretely present from the beginning of the book and concerns the nature of the region as a colony and Finland as a colonial state. Pälsi rejoices the trip "to abroad," which at the same time is a trip "to our property," to "the great colony of Finnish hopes and dreams." He depicts Petsamo as friendly and hospitable, but simultaneously as a tough and frightening place. The ambivalence is also present in the way the "Lapps" encountered in Inari before entering Petsamo are represented:

they are lower in status, but on many occasions Pälsi thanks them for their tidiness and for maintaining their patriotic spirit, whilst adopting some marks of "civilization". This ambivalence is deepest in the encounter with the Lappish gentleman, Juhani Jomppanen, an intelligent, cultivated, well-travelled gentleman who planned to nominate himself as the next witch in Sodankylä, since he possessed enough strength of character to replace the old, retiring witch; this is presented with only a slight sense of irony. Finally, in Petsamo, the view of the Skolt Sami is a racializing view of those with lower status, but as inhabitants of the wilderness the Skolt Sami also appear as a tough and persevering people, since in Finnish imagery the people of the wilderness were idealized for surviving in scarce and hard conditions and were sometimes ranked higher than the people living an easy life in the south. For the same reason, but to a greater extent, this also applies to the Finnish settlers who have established a house in Petsamo and who rank highest in Pälsi's hierarchies. According to Pälsi, the Skolt Sami were starving as a consequence of not practicing an agrarian subsistence and way of life (Pälsi 1931: 7–9, 11–12, 18–19, 22–24, 27).

Southern Finland and the modernization introduced from the south are also represented in an ambivalent manner. People from the south had poorer qualities in surviving the Arctic environment, but Finnish modernization was already progressing in Petsamo, could not be stopped and was represented as a blessing to the region and to the people living there, including "the native, primitive nomads [...] if they are fit to do that." On the other hand, the new impulses had taken away the "original force" of the Skolt Sami culture (Pälsi 1931: 53–54); this was a typical strategy in Finnish Petsamo literature, distinguishing between the authentic, "unspoiled" Suenjel-Sami and the "spoiled," Finnicized Skolt Sami by the road.

Pälsi creates a representation of the Skolt Sami as the guardians of the cultural border, as the guardians of the "secrets" of the Skolt Sami culture. The ambivalence is most obvious here as Pälsi shows no respect for either the border or its guardians, but uses numerous Skolt Sami on his journey as guides and informants, lets himself be guided to the sacred places and excavates archaeological items to be collected in the museums down south in a true colonial manner. Nor is he distracted on another occasion by what he calls "Lapp hags" protesting in the background when they mistakenly believe he is in the process of opening a Skolt Sami grave. If Pälsi's ambivalence worked on another occasions to restore the Skolt Sami agency, in his archaeological mission it achieved the contrary and the border was crossed despite protests (Pälsi 1931: 52–55, 70–72). The border was more unconditional/absolute against Norway than against the Skolt Sami, the new citizens of Finland. The problem with Norwegians is a constant theme in

the literature of the era (Nyyssönen 2008: 45–47). The negativity originated from known facts during this period: the poor handling of minorities of Finnish or Sami extraction in Norway, or the Norwegian doubts expressed about the minorities mentioned being a security threat, which Pälsi ridiculed. This deeper border, being official and protected by national and international legislation, is marked in the book by a scene where the travellers stop to celebrate and honour the first encountered boundary marker at the Finnish-Norwegian border, while the crossing of the old border to Petsamo, between Finland and what was then Russia is not mentioned at all (Pälsi 1931: 26, 30–31, 76–77).

Pälsi and his wife had to rely on the local people as guides and informants, and as cultural interpreters. Thus, for Pälsi, the cultural border was also a meeting-point, a bridge (Newman 2006: 8; Schimanski 2008: 31–32), which the Skolt Sami both guarded and could cross, but under Finnish premises. Pälsi did not merely meet the Skolt Sami at the border, in order to let himself be guided to their cultural treasures: he allowed the Skolt Sami to be integrated into the Finnish nation through his excavations, integrating them into the Finnish past. Finding themselves at this actual border (Lehtola 1999a: 153), the Skolt Sami intention or strategy has been described as cautious and protective of their culture.

Pälsi's work is an example of what Avtar Brah and Einar Niemi have written about: the complexity of the ethnic encounter, which is never a purely colonial one between the dominant and the subjugated. There may be purely numerical mismatches, where the dominant majority might not find itself in the numerical majority or (as in the case of Pälsi) discursive mismatches of representation, where the object of the colonial gaze finds itself in numerous subject positions (Brah 2007: 81; Niemi 2004: 92–93, 100–101, 116–117).

Nickul Writes Back from the Other Side of the Border

If Pälsi's text is a sign of Finnish ambivalence, this attitude and the lack of respect for the cultural border had disappeared in the text by Karl Nickul on the Skolt Sami published after the Second World War. The whole of Finland had new borders, and new borders were now being drawn in the political sphere, signifying a new political culture and new political orientation. International politics had changed drastically in the wake of the war and suddenly Finland had to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The aims of the "new friend" were (and still are) unknown, but the Finnish political leadership lived under the impression that Finland was under threat. The friendship policy was undertaken in order to tackle this threat (Pernaa 2005: 177). This meant new limitations on what appeared to be democratic

in the new Soviet-friendly political constellation and, following the defeat of Hitler, diminishing possibilities of expressing hierarchies based on racial differences and biology. This process was slow (Nyyssönen 2007: 76–77), but by the time of the publication of Nickul's main work, *The Lappish Nation. Citizens of Four Countries* (1977),[2] the racial paradigm had disappeared; one expression of this is that by now, the cultural border was actually appreciated and acknowledged, trying to maintain the integrity of the people and trying to reserve the discursive space of self-representation for them as well.

Nickul, a geodesist, the most prominent Sami friend in Finland and an expert on Skolt Sami culture, is coherent in his way of celebrating the unspoiled *siida* of Suenjel, protected by wilderness (a natural border) and, although split by national borders, sustaining its integrity in conditions of increasing contact elsewhere in Lapland. He also presents the border system maintained and adjusted by the *sobbar*, the Skolt Sami village council, as an institution securing the livelihoods of the whole of the *siida*. This view originates from the other side of the border: the Skolt Sami appearing as guardians of their borders who are capable of adapting (for example as active citizens) to the new conditions and the Finns becoming the threatening "Other," disturbing the sophisticated society, cultural integrity and indeed its borders. Even though Nickul had crossed the border and entered the Skolt Sami society in a very intimate way, respect for the border lacked the ambivalence present in Pälsi's work (Lehtola 2000: 41–57, 198–200; Nickul 1948: passim; Nickul 1977: 2, 6–7, 11, 17, 55–56; *sobbar* had lost its authority concerning the border after the war, see Pelto 1962: 83–86). If the work by Pälsi is also a landmark in the ambivalent relation to Finnish colonialism, the work by Nickul marks the impossibility of this idea in an "anti-imperialistic" post-war Finland.

The change in the control of the border highlights how the border is not static but dynamic, temporal and constantly changing. Borders are created in an interaction with other actors, institutions and individuals (Newman 2006: 5–8; Schimanski 2008: 32). Obviously, conditions for the control of the border improved after the war for the Skolt Sami, who themselves strengthened the border. Some demonstrations of this are to be found in the field of academic research. The Sami are a well-researched group, but as early as 1975 the Skolt Sami in Sevettijärvi decided to question who benefits from the research on the Sami and the Skolt Sami *sobbar* refused to assist yet another research programme, well before the introduction of indigenous research ethics guidelines and protocols (*Sabmelaš* 1975). Thanks to an increasing sensitivity concerning the border, the encounter is no longer marked by the adjusting the Skolt Sami to Finnish discourses; instead, the power of definition has been taken by the Skolt Sami themselves (Ingold

1976: 10–11; Lehtola 2005: 51; Sverloff 2003: passim).

Many of the changes in the control of the border can be credited to the consistently respectful attitude Nickul entertained towards the Sami in his personal contacts and in his writings on Sami culture. However, the disappearance of remnants of hierarchicizing the Skolt Sami on the basis of authenticity or on the basis of theories concerning the evolution of societies,[3] reserving the right of self-identification to the Sami themselves, took some time as far as Nickul himself was concerned (Lehtola 2000: 41–57; Nyyssönen 2007: 138–140). Most of Nickul's identity politics can be credited to him personally. In a political context, one can point to the codification of post-war Finland as a "good state," ruled by law and equality (see for example Alasuutari 1996: 155, 159). In the 1970s, especially, this way of perceiving the state of Finland as a representative of all things good, international solidarity, neo-Marxist anti-imperialism, friendly relations with neighbouring countries, etc. became the dominant imagery. The state of Finland was overwhelmed by the project of building a modern welfare state and remained a firm, natural frame of identification, no longer through the nationalistic, linguistic-cultural sense of belonging, but through a process of modernization and employment, marginalizing the idea of Finland as a colonial power as impossible.

Conclusions

Both the ambivalence concerning the borders and the Finnish colonialism in Pälsi's text, as well as the condemnation of Finnish modernization in Nickul's text took part within the discussion concerning national identity. For Pälsi, the control of the border was about strengthening differences and categorizing the Skolt Sami as lower, and thus distinguishing the young nation state of Finland as a modern, yet partially-inclusive state. For Nickul, identity politics were partially embedded on a loathing of the colonialist remnants of the nationalistic first republic. By labelling the Skolt Sami as the rational, good actors, the detrimental aspects of the modernization project were pointed out, as well as those concerning the consequences of an ambivalent border management.

As we already saw in the introduction, the border is a socially constitutive entity (Schimanski 2008: 31). The border is also a constitutive historical factor that includes and excludes and moulds the destinies of the different peoples finding themselves within the borders. The Finnish state chose to integrate the Skolt Sami, although in a selective and ambivalent manner. The Skolt Sami culture was not annihilated in the same manner as in Norway (Niemi 2002: 103–104, 108), but rather integrated and modernized. The coerciveness of this project was sealed by the Second World War and resettle-

ment. There was a serious, yet not totally successful effort to protect the Skolt Sami culture as well, one indication of which is the still-functioning *sobbar*. This can be credited to a great extent to the work of Karl Nickul.

NOTES

[1] A Sami or reindeer village, *siida* in Northern Sami, refers to both the area and the people living in the autonomous area of the *siida*. It is a governmental area for practising the Sami means of living (hunting, fishing and reindeer herding) with negotiable borders and was the main feature of community organization in most of Finnish Lapland until the end of the nineteenth century. Concerning the Suenjel Sami, the *siida* administration remained almost intact until the Second World War (Ingold 1976: 4–5, 8; Tanner 1929: 86–87).

[2] A revised edition of *Saamelaiset kansana ja kansalaisina*, published in 1970 through the Finnish Literary Society.

[3] These hierarchies are evident in an earlier work on the Suenjel Sami (Nickul: 1948, 11–12). In this ethnographic work, the interest of knowledge lies in a tribal society's inevitable adjustment to Finnish society, a development that has to be made from a Skolt Sami initiative, if at all, since the development contains a risk of moral and material deterioration. Nickul strove for an equal outlook—the Skolt Sami culture would also contribute majority culture in the cultural exchange, while some features of the Skolt Sami culture would vanish.

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ROLF INGE LARSEN

Reconciliation or Power Struggle?

On the Consecration of the Chapel in Skibotn in 1931

ABSTRACT In the inter-war period there was a massive Norwegianization campaign in the northern parts of Norway. This campaign was a result of the ideology of nationalism as well as the fact that Norway recently had received its full independence and regarded a border security policy in the north as necessary. Since Finland had received its independence in 1917, some nationalist organizations in Finland wanted to expand the Finnish territory northwards to the Arctic Ocean. The ethnic aspect of this conflict was that a Finnish speaking minority, the Kvens, had settled in Northern Norway. Norwegian central authorities feared that the Kvens would feel a stronger loyalty towards Finland than Norway.

Religion was a central aspect of this conflict with implications for minority and security policy issues. On one hand the National church was regarded as a nation building tool by the state in the ethnically mixed northern border regions. On the other hand many of the Kvens, as well as the Sami, adhered to the pietistic and puritan Laestadian revival movement which was critical towards the National church. Although the Laestadians were officially members of the National church, the movement had their own assemblies and independent religious structures.

In this article I discuss the National church and the Laestadian movement in the light of nation building and minority policy in the northern borderland of Norway.

KEYWORDS Laestadianism, Kvens, Bishop Berggrav, Erik Johnsen, Norwegianization

On Monday, 22 June 1931, the chapel in Skibotn was consecrated as a chapel of the Church of Norway. The chapel, described by the Bishop as a "shed," was packed with people. Until then, it had been a Meeting House for Laestadian services. There were 350 people in a house that according to Norwegian building laws only should have taken 270. But the Bishop had implored the authorities to allow more people, and after some time, permission was given in the name of reconciliation (*Norvegia Sacra* 1932: 201 f.; Berggrav 1943: 127 ff.). The consecration ceremony was held at the time when the Laestadians used to have a "gathering," that is an assembly lasting several days. During the consecration both Norwegian clergymen and Laestadian lay preachers participated, as well as a Finnish Lutheran priest on travel in these areas.

In this article, I discuss how the aspects of religion and ethnicity influenced the relations between the National church of Norway[1] and the Laestadian revival movement[2] in the inter-war period. These relations were characterized at the same time by struggle for power and acts for reconciliation, even though all the Laestadians were members of the national church. My hypothesis is that both groups tried to put a stigma on each other by interpreting central biblical and ecclesiastical expressions in different ways. This could express their struggle for power without damaging the impression of reconciliation. I discuss this hypothesis by focusing on one variously significant event from the ethnic and religious meetings in Northern Norway in the inter-war years. This event is the consecration of the chapel in Skibotn, where the two leading figures, Bishop Eivind Berggrav and the Laestadian lay preacher Erik Johnsen,[3] met in a common service initiated by the Bishop.

The main questions I discuss are: did the Norwegian National Church and Bishop Eivind Berggrav in Hålogaland diocese use the consecration of the chapel in Skibotn to proclaim sovereignty in the area, and were the religious liturgy, texts, and psalms chosen to stigmatize the local inhabitants? Did the Laestadian leader, Erik Johnsen, counter-stigmatize in his sermon? And if so, was this an intentional action or a side effect seen in posterity?

According to Norman Fairclough discourses of ideology construct meanings that produce, reproduce and transform relations of dominance (Fairclough 1992: 87). I think the consecration of the church in Skibotn reveals ideological discourses of stigmatization and counter-stigmatization which must be read against the background of a Norwegian cultural borderland policy in the face of a perceived "Finnish menace" (see note 5).

The Reason for Conflict and the Norwegian Policy

In the inter-war period, there was a conflict in the northern parts of Norway on nation-building and minority politics. Officially, this led to a massive

Norwegianization campaign, that is a policy of assimilation. This campaign was a result of the ideology of nationalism as well as the fact that Norway recently had received its full independence and regarded a border security policy in the north as necessary. Finland had received its independence in 1917, and some nationalist organizations in Finland wished to expand the Finnish territory northwards to the Arctic Ocean. However, the Finnish government made it clear that it had no such intensions. The Norwegian authorities did not trust this statement, and this led to the establishment of relations between the Church, the military defence, and several government departments, including the department of foreign affairs. The goal of the Norwegian policy was to shield the Kvens[4] from Finnish exposure by isolating them. This was done by a huge cultural offensive that was meant to neutralise the Finnish nationalist propaganda (Ryymin 2004: 292). The offensive aimed at building a *cultural border* in the north. This border of churches and schools (and other cultural institutions of the state) should stand as a fortress, guarding Norway from cultural influence from other countries and preventing what Bishop Berggrav called the *psychological attraction* the Kvens felt towards Finland (Statsarkivet i Tromsø: Biskopen i Hålogaland 236: 1928–1937 Finske Fare, Brev til Utenriksministeren). This attraction arose, the Bishop believed, because the Kvens could see that there were a lot of well-functioning cultural state institutions in the north of Finland.

Theoretical Approach. Stigma and Counter-Stigma

In the meeting between "normal" and "abnormal," the "abnormal" is often stigmatized as inferior and less human. In Northern Norway in the interwar period, the state represented the "normal" and the Kvens were considered "abnormal" and actually dangerous, politically as well as religiously.

The sociologist Norbert Elias deals with socio-dynamics of stigmatization and what he defines as counter-stigmatization. He claims that the stigmatizing begins with a fear of the outsiders (Elias & Scotson 1999: 135). He shows how stigma is put on the outsiders through "gossip-channels," where housewives maintain the power of their group by the way they speak (Elias & Scotson 1999: 48). The relation between groups seems nice as they speak, but under the surface it is conflictual. The conflict appears when the phrase "nice people" does not mean what it says, but is a description of the outsiders (Elias & Scotson 1999: 35–36).

According to Elias, a counter-stigmatization can happen if the power-balance between different groups changes during a period of time (Elias 1999: xxxi–xxxiii). But I think it is possible that counter-stigmatization can be seen as a remedy to change the power-balance by building identity on

re-coded values. If so, this results in other values and a different hierarchy of status than in the rest of society. The Norwegian religious scholar Roald E. Kristiansen describes how areas such as language, clothing, life-style, and ways of gathering are given different values among Laestadians than in official society, for instance concerning the ideal of poverty (Kristiansen 1998: 158). The consequence of new codes for right behaviour then becomes a counter-stigmatization from the inferior. This is one explanation of the success of the Laestadian movement, as written about by the Norwegian historians Einar-Arne Drivenes and Einar Niemi. They describe a theory of cultural defence and preservation and refer to earlier historians who have explained Laestadianism as a political reaction against modernisation, secularisation, and cultural pressure (Drivenes & Niemi 2000: 158 f.). I think this perspective can be broadened, for example in the way Roald E. Kristiansen does when he states that the Laestadian movement is not a religion *for* the Kvens, but *from* the Kvens (and the Sami) *to* the national inhabitants in the area where the revival has gained a foothold (Kristiansen 1998: 164). From this point of view, the Laestadian movement can be seen not only as comfort and fortress for a stigmatized and inferior group, but also as a counter-message to everyone in society. They present a new ideological discourse according to Fairclough.

The counter-stigmatization seems to fit in the picture of re-coding when it claims opposite values as the highest norm and thereby turns the picture, questioning who is established and who is inferior. In Northern Norway in the inter-war years, I think it is possible to see this counter-stigmatisation in the religious discourses, where two Christian subject positions use the same ecclesiastical material. Both the National Norwegian Church and the Laestadians truly believed they had God and Martin Luther on their side.

The Ethnic Aspect

The geographical situation in Skibotn is important. As noticed in Knut Einar Eriksen and Einar Niemi's book about "the Finnish Menace,"[5] Skibotn had a strategic national and military position in the inter-war period. Already at the turn of the twentieth century, the Kvens (in Skibotn and all over Northern Norway) were considered a risk in which the Norwegian military authorities had a special interest (Eriksen & Niemi 1981). In 1936, the Norwegian journalist Arthur Ratche described the area around Skibotn as a natural borderline if the Finns wanted to cut the county of Finnmark from the rest of Norway (Ratche: 1936: 141; Eriksen & Niemi 1981: 285).

What kind of a society was the village of Skibotn then? It seems there were small social differences between the ethnic groups in Skibotn. Norwegians represented the national establishment, while the Kvens (and the

Sami) were outsiders on a national basis, and therefore also locally. The demarcation was built on the power "the established" had as Norwegians, which gave them the right to consider the Kvens as inferior and possible competitors in the area. This was based on what the established regarded as a threat to their Norwegianness.

This map below shows the location of Skibotn. As we can see, it is only a short distance away from the borders of Finland and Sweden. Skibotn is situated at the end of a valley that leads to the "Treriksrøysa" (i.e. the point where the three borders meet).



Fig. 1. The location of Skibotn.

In the inter-war years, there were three large ethnic groups in Northern Norway: the Norwegians, the Sami, and the Kvens. The ethnic aspect of the conflict was related to the Finnish-speaking minority, the Kvens, who had settled in relatively large numbers, almost 16% (Ratche 1936: 18), in the counties of Troms and Finnmark. Norwegian central authorities feared that the Kvens would feel a stronger loyalty towards Finland than towards Norway, and that the Kvens would side with Finland in case of a future conflict. The reason for this fear was the before-mentioned nationalist movement[6] in Finland and their expansive ideas. An example of this is shown in the map (Fig. 2.) used by the periodical *Aito-Suomalainen* ['The Real-Finn'].

Fig. 2. Map printed in *Aiti-Suomalainen* as reprinted in Eriksen & Niemi (1981: 185).

The horizontal lines cover what was Finland at that time. The dotted areas show what the nationalists thought belonged to "Greater-Finland." The black area is the sea and the white areas are Russia (USSR), Sweden and Norway. The area in the north is the Norwegian counties of Finnmark and half of Troms. This and similar maps concerned the Norwegian authorities even though they were probably not literally meant by the Finnish nationalists.

The Aspect of Religion

Religion was a central aspect of the conflict and had implications for minority and security policy issues. On one hand, the Norwegian state church was regarded a nation-building tool by the state in the ethnically mixed northern border regions. It was a suitable structure for local surveillance, with loyal clergymen all over the nation. Seemingly, the clergymen were sometimes caught in a conflict of loyalty between God and the State, but in the inter-war years it seems that most of them were loyal to the State and the Norwegianization idea. The Norwegian historians Knut Einar Eriksen, Einar Niemi, and Einar-Arne Drivenes show in two articles the discussions over time inside the church organisation and how the assimilation policy found a foothold in the inter-war years (Eriksen & Niemi 1982; Drivenes 2004). Eriksen and Niemi point at the double action of Bishop Berggrav: officially, he acted as a spiritual adviser, covertly, he was an agent for the assimilation policy and the surveillance of the Kvens, in close connection with civil and military authorities (Eriksen & Niemi 1982: 26).

On the other hand, many of the Kvens, as well as the Sami, adhered to the Pietistic and Puritan Laestadian revival movement, which was critical of the National Church and opposed the official minority policy. Although officially the Laestadians were members of the national church, the move-

ment had its own assemblies and independent religious structures. Sermons were often performed in Finnish, enabling the Kvens to keep their own language, customs, and traditions in their new home country. For a period of time, the movement became a fortress for minority culture and language as well as for conservative and puritan Christian faith within the national church.

The Consecration of the Chapel in Skibotn

The three main sources for this event in the literature are a reportage in the newspaper *Tromsø* 23 june 1931, *Alterbok for den norske kirke* 1922, and the sermon of Erik Johnsen (Olsen & Skorpa 1931). In the light of these sources I will focus on some contents of the liturgy and the sermons of Berggrav and Johnsen.

In the Church of Norway, the liturgy is determined by the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs. The liturgy is found in the Altar Book, and the book in use in 1931 was licensed in 1922. The Altar Book tells how the priests should conduct services and ecclesiastical affairs and is to be seen as an ordinance. As we shall see, Bishop Berggrav did not follow all of the instructions in this book but made some valuable changes, which are described in the newspaper reportage.

The newspaper reportage is from the only daily newspaper in the region, *Tromsø*, and is the only one of its kind on the subject. The article does not say who the journalist is, but the newspaper belonged to the conservative side. The article is not the main subject but is printed on page 4 and continues on page 7. The reportage tells what hymns and prayers were used and gives a comprehensive account of Berggrav's sermon.

Erik Johnsen's sermon is printed in a collection of Laestadian sermons. Johnsen's sermon was translated from Finnish to Norwegian, which probably gave the sermon recorder sufficient time to take notes. Besides, it is a normal practice in the Laestadian movement that the preacher is allowed to proofread before printing.

It is important to have in mind that the two sermons were written down by listeners in the assembly; as texts, they are thus probably just the main impressions of the sermons.

The Liturgy

The Church of Norway has its own liturgy for consecration of churches and chapels. Bishop Berggrav, who led the service, chose to deviate from the standard liturgy. In the Altar Book it is said that at least five priests (excluding the Dean and the Bishop) should participate in a consecration (*Alterbok for den norske kirke* 1922: 190). But the Bishop asked three lay Laestadian

preachers and a guest priest from the Finnish church, pastor Miettinen,[7] to replace the required Norwegian priests. They all participated in the service. This choice gives an impression of reconciliation. I think it was of great importance to the Bishop that both the Laestadian laymen and the Finnish priest were easily seen. In this matter, the Bishop acted in a conciliatory manner, as Eriksen and Niemi have indicated.

In contrast, it is interesting to see which Epistle the son of Erik Johnsen, Erik Eriksen, was asked to read. This text is the fourth in the liturgy and from Hebrews Chapter 10. In Norwegian, this is expressed as "not leaving the congregation like some people do" (*Alterbok for den norske kirke* 1922: 197),[8] which can be seen as a political statement to make people stay in the Church of Norway instead of acting in separatist ways. There was an ongoing debate about this topic in the Laestadian movement.

The church prayer after the sermon of the Bishop connects the Church of Norway to God as His property and states that it is built on what is the only true belief. The prayer went as follows: "Show mercy to Your church in our fatherland and edify it in the belief in Jesus Christ" (*Alterbok for den norske kirke* 1922: 202). Based on these two parts of the liturgy I find it reasonable to maintain that the church regarded itself as a national unit and found it necessary for the inhabitants of Norway to stay put as members of the national church. In this respect, Berggrav's actions can be seen as a way of creating a stigma on *who* were right Christians and *what* was the "true church." A Christian was a member of the church, and the church was tied to the fatherland, in plain words: a Norwegian citizen.

The Sermon of the Bishop

The sermon of Bishop Eivind Berggrav was, as mentioned, reported in the newspaper *Tromsø* the following day (23 June 1931). According to the reportage, the Bishop began his sermon with this prayer: "We beg thee God that You sanctify in us a Temple where You can live. Be patient in prayer, and let God open a door that reveals the Secret of God."[9] It seems that the Bishop had chosen the First Epistle General of Peter chapter 2 verse 5 as Bible text: "Ye also, as lively stones, are built up a spiritual house, a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ" (see *Tromsø* 23 June 1931; Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 123; http://www.artbible.info/bible/1_peter/2.html).

By referring to this text, the Bishop bears in mind how Luther considered the church to be the congregation (i.e. the community of many people), and not only a building. He speaks of the tradition in *our* church of preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments, showing how the regulations in the official Norwegian church are set to watch over this tradi-

tion. "This is the reason why you[10] and we are gathered in the consecration," says the Bishop. The Church of Norway has got a new home for the Word of God and the sacraments. In a way, he is saying that this house has at last been consecrated to serve the purpose it has been serving for thirty years already. Beside this, it is remarkable to see how the Bishop speaks of the Christians. Every time they are mentioned, they are referred to in plural; as congregation, assembly, believers, flock, human souls, we, and us. The church is a meeting spot for God and the people. There are no references to a Christian as a single human being.

With respect to power struggle or reconciliation, the Bishop seemingly wants to invite the people in to the national church and thereby into the national fellowship. This is definitively a conciliatory action, but as I see it, it bears an underlying stigma: at last, the chapel has become a real house of God; administered according to God's will by the state. Bishop Berggrav actually is saying in plain words that in every congregation there has to be order and right procedure. The undertone is: it is *we* who are the real church and it is *we* who are the real Norwegians. If you want to be a Christian, you have to be like us.

Erik Johnsen's Sermon

The Laestadian lay preacher Erik Johnsen spoke in Finnish and was translated into Norwegian. The sermon is printed in Norwegian (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 119–126). He conducted his sermon after the solemn consecration-mass was over. In his sermon, Johnsen used the biblical text from The Gospel according to Matthew chapter 28, verse 18–20, which is known in Norwegian as "Misjonsbefalingen" ['The Order of Mission'].[11] Most probably, this means that he intended to talk about mission, that is the spreading of Christianity. From this starting point, he used a lot of Epistles as arguments for his sermon. His sermon is to be understood mainly as it is: a consecration sermon where he stands as a solemn Lutheran Christian, which corresponds with the Norwegian church dogma based on the Lutheran scripture *Confessio Augustana* (1530). He also refers to Bishop Berggrav in his sermon (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 123).

But there are two interesting lines in his sermon that may signify a demarcation towards the national church as it was presented in the sermon of Bishop Berggrav; both lines are related to the rhetorical use of language that constitutes certain narratives. This corresponds with what Elias shows in his study of Winston Parva, where the narratives are used to stigmatize one part of the inhabitants (Elias & Scotson 1999: 17, 38). The first line regards the Church and the second line is about the Christians. What Johnsen says about the Church is interesting in a national Lutheran context. To him, the

church is the place where "The Word of God" is preached in the right way and the sacraments are in use (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 119, 124). In the Lutheran Church there are only two sacraments, that is the Communion and the Baptism. Besides, Johnsen describes the Church as a worldwide church based on *one true belief* tied together in Jesus Christ (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 122 f., 125). The idea of a worldwide church is to be seen in contrast to the Lutheran idea of national autonomous churches. Not once in his sermon does he refer to the church as a Norwegian or national unit. In this respect he gives an unspoken definition that differs from the Bishop's on what a Christian is and how to understand the church as a geographical unit. Furthermore, Erik Johnsen describes, with biblical references, the Christians as singular humans who with their own mouths are "confessors of Jesus Christ," with a "*personal belief* and responsibility for their own life," and as "guardians of the Word of God" (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 119–121, 124 f.). "Sanctification" is the visible sign of Christian life for everyone that belongs to "The People of God" (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 125 f.).

Based on the interpretation above, the question is whether the content of the sermon is related to reconciliation or to power struggle. Undoubtedly, Erik Johnsen wanted to make sure that he was a true Lutheran Christian, and in this respect, he showed conciliatory trait. Another trait of reconciliation is when he cites the sermon of the Bishop in his own sermon, thus connecting himself with the top authority in the Church. But there are also some traits of the ongoing power struggle: the main issue must be that Erik Johnsen preached in Finnish. By doing so, he made a clear front to the assimilation politics in Norway, which had a language-policy where everyone living in Norway had to speak Norwegian. By speaking Finnish he set a kind of counter-stigma where the outsiders were the preferred listeners. He turned the picture around because the translation of his sermon was needed by the Norwegian clergymen, as they had been placed as outsiders dependent on translation. In *Tromsø* Johnsen is referred to regarding the need for translating, as there were two mother tongues among the listeners. This can be understood as a gesture towards the Finnish pastor or as an explanation of why he had to translate it into Norwegian. It is well known that in 1920 in a big meeting with 950 participants in Kristiania (Oslo from 1925) he chose to speak in Sami even if to my knowledge there were no Sami-speaking persons among the listeners, except for his translator (Olsen 2004: 130; Molland 1968: 81). When it comes to the congregation in Skibotn, it is conceivable that most of them understood the Finnish language pretty well as it was in daily use in the area.

At last he interprets the expressions "Church" and "Christian" in a way that releases the listeners from the national fellowship of a church, giv-

ing the Christian believers an opportunity to decide themselves what true Christianity is. The Church is not the people of Norway but the people of God, and therefore it is not the state, but God, who decides right from wrong. This is counter-stigmatization in the terms of Norbert Elias: Erik Johnsen gives the congregation another expression, a new narrative that in his opinion is closer to the truth and the will of God.

Concluding Remarks

From the discussion above, it is plausible to claim that the consecration of the chapel in Skibotn is a proclamation of Norwegian sovereignty in the area. By using the Laestadian laymen in the service, which also could and should be seen as a gesture towards the national minorities in the area, the Bishop frames them in what is a national and officially prescribed ceremony. In a way, the Bishop takes their support for his church-view as granted, making the leading men of Laestadianism in Norway look like deserters to their own congregation. As the liturgy shows, the service is a celebration of the national church, with special focus on the masses. It is a stigma put on the people of Skibotn: they are Norwegians to the extent that they are members of a flock belonging to a national church. This is also reflected in the sermon of the Bishop. The newspaper reporter has definitely got the point, ending his reportage in this way:

> And then the chapel in Skibotn is consecrated. It stands as an outermost outpost for the Norwegian church and the Norwegian culture in a place where foreign influence on language and national character is strong.[12]

In his sermon, Erik Johnsen gives the congregation a different opinion on both the church and the Christians. What he says can be seen as an answer to Bishop Berggrav. The church is a worldwide assembly with confessing singular humans. In his sermon there is no national church, only Christians belonging to a confession. This means that the confessors themselves have to decide if the meaning of a sermon is correct according to the confession. This also means there are no official formulas that are valid unless the personal believers find it initiated in the Bible. Johnsen gives the congregation a counter-stigma tool: they have to decide themselves whether the preacher speaks the truth or not.

I find it reasonable to believe that both Berggrav and Johnsen saw the consecration ceremony as an important event in each of their settings, an event on which they put their personal political marks. The chapel became a national symbol in the nation's exposed areas, expanding the religious and cultural jurisdiction of the state. In addition, it became an ethno-political

symbol for the inhabitants, where their local preacher could speak to them in Finnish. Whether they intentionally wanted to put a stigma and a counter-stigma on each other is hard to say, but the analysis of their religious discourses shows that they certainly had different opinions on central ecclesiastical issues, even if the outward impression was meant to be that they belonged to a conciliatory unity.

NOTES

[1] The Norwegian national church has been a Lutheran church since it was instituted in the 1530s in the kingdom of Denmark-Norway. It is a unit independent of other national Lutheran churches (also the Danish), even though it has mainly the same confessional scriptures. The main difference is that in the Norwegian national church, the Concordia-book is not a confessional script. Among the Laestadians, it is considered as a confessional script, probably because the movement is of Swedish origin (the Concordia-book was a confessional script in the national Swedish Lutheran church and in Finland).

[2] The revival movement is named after the Swedish clergyman Lars Levi Laestadius and is rooted in the northern parts of Sweden, Finland, and Norway. This revival started in Karesuando in the 1840s, where Laestadius lived and worked. In the beginning, it spread mainly with the Sami movements and the migration flows in the Nordic circumpolar areas. This migration was mainly caused by the Kvens moving to the Norwegian coastline. As a traditional revival, the Laestadian movement focused on conversion. Furthermore, the movement preached total abstinence, and the languages used in preaching were mostly Finnish or Sami.

[3] Eivind Berggrav (1884–1959) was educated as a priest in 1908 and wrote a dissertation on Psychology of religion in 1924. In 1928, he was appointed bishop in the diocese of Hålogaland (Norways' three northernmost counties). His time as bishop in Hålogaland is described in his book *Land of Suspense. Visitation-Glimpses of North-Norway* ("*Spenningens land*") from 1936 (edited in English in 1943). In 1937, he was appointed bishop in Oslo. Erik Johnsen (1844–1941) was a lay preacher in the Laestadian movement from a settlement a few miles from Skibotn. His sermons to the congregations were in Norwegian, Sami, and Finnish, depending on who the listeners were. He became the leading figure in the western area of the Laestadian movement in Norway. He was eager to have a good relationship with the national church, and he often tried to demarcate against other Laestadian groups.

[4] The Kvens are today accepted as a national minority in Norway. The official ethnonym is *Kven* (sing.), *Kvens* (plur.), though also other names have been used. The Kvens are descendants of immigrants in Northern Norway with Finnish cultural background. The peak of the immigration was in the nineteenth century.

[5] *The Finnish Menace* is their own translation of the Norwegian expression *den finske fare*, which was the term used in Norwegian governmental letters on the tense situation between Norway and Finland.

[6] In the inter-war years, a lot of organisations were founded. The leading organisation was *Akateenminen Karjala-Seura* (AKS), which co-operated with the other organisations and groups founded on a nationalistic idea. This was a student organisation founded in 1922 that was organised as a militant fighting unit with a closed elitist structure. It was a

rather small organisation according to membership (never more than 2,000), but it had great influence in the political area (Ryymin 2004: 252f.).

[7] Some Norwegian newspapers name him *Methien*. See the newspaper *Tromsø 23* June 1931.

[8] There is a difference in the wording between the English and Norwegian translation of the Bible in this text, and the whole point on "not leaving the congregation" is diffuse in the English translation.

[9] My translation of: "Vi ber dig Gud at du vigsler i oss selv et temple i vårt indre hvor du kan bo. Vær vedholden i bønnen, og la Gud oplate en dør som åpenbarer Guds hemmelighet."

[10] In Norwegian, this is pronounced as *dere*, which corresponds to the plural form of the English word *you*.

[11] In English, the Epistle is known as "Order of Baptism". In Norwegian, it is known as both "Order of Baptism" and "Order of Mission." Erik Johnsen presents the text as "Order of Mission" (Olsen & Skorpa 1931: 119).

[12] My translation of: "Så er da Skibotn kapell innviet, og står der som den norske kirkes og den norske kulturs ytterste utpost på et sted hvor fremmed innflydelse i sprog og folkekarakter er sterk" (*Tromsø* 23 June 1931).

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Fortifications in the Wilderness

The Making of Swedish-Russian Borderlands around 1900

ABSTRACT In the decades around 1900 the northern territories between Sweden-Norway and Finland-Russia were created and enforced as significant borderlands. In the article I situate the making of these borderlands in what was known as "the Defence Question." Taking my point of departure in this heated political debate, I discuss the various cultural meanings that were ascribed to the Swedish-Russian borderlands. I argue that at the time the discourse about the Swedish-Russian relationships stretched out and made the northern parts of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Russia into a vast frontier between the west and the east, the occident and the orient and civilisation versus barbarism. In making borders culturally significant, material culture plays a vital role. In the article I analyze flags, border stones and the fortifications in Boden, Sweden. Through the discourse about the fortifications, the borderlands between Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Finland took on a new strategic meaning. In the political and public debate they served as a means to bring together trade, industry, communication and defence politics into one overarching narrative. The general argument of my article is that the historical study of borderlands can benefit from analyzing significant political debates, and from exploring the material culture of past borderlands.

KEYWORDS borderlands, anthropology of borders, material culture, fortifications, the defence question, Norrland, Boden

Haparanda, the Summer of 1900. An Introduction

A sense of anticipation spread as the company of travellers approached the border.[1] The municipality of Haparanda and its surrounding areas on the Swedish side of the river were filled with flags. One traveller

stated that he had never seen so many flags concentrated in one place before (Centerwall 1901: 130 f.). This account is found in an article published in the Swedish yearbook *Svea* in 1901, written by Julius Centerwall, a member of the Swedish Parliament.

In the summer of 1900 one hundred and fifty Swedish politicians, officers and administrative staff went to the northern parts of Norrland. Since 1809 they constituted the border to the Grand Duchy of Finland, a part of Imperial Russia. One reason for making this trip was the costly decisions that the Parliament recently had made concerning the province (Centerwall 1901: 103 f.). In the late 1800s Norrland became envisioned as the land of a prosperous future (Sörlin 1988). But Norrbotten and Lappland were also border provinces, and from the 1880s onward several politicians, journalists and the military argued that Sweden could be facing an assault in these parts of the country.

The travellers made their first stop in the village of Boden (ca 1,100 kilometres north of Stockholm), where the Parliament one year earlier had finally decided to construct a huge fortification. The mountain hills surrounding Boden were going to be transformed into "a Nordic inland Gibraltar" (Centerwall 1901: 109). In the discussions, before and during the construction of the fortification, the borderlands between Sweden-Norway and Finland-Russia were ascribed meaning and reinforced as strategically important. The making of these borderlands will be discussed and analyzed in this article.

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Since the end of the 1980s the world has changed dramatically and in the context of these transformations research about borders has increased significantly (see for example François, Seifarth & Struck 2006: 7 f.). The trend is perhaps most visible within anthropology. In two books—*Border Identities. Nation and State at International Frontiers* (1998) and *Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (1999)—the anthropologists Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson present a new approach to borderlands which can be summed up in three points.

Firstly, they state that borderlands are both sites and symbols of power. This is materially manifested through watchtowers, border stones, barbed wire fences and other material artefacts. *Secondly*, borders are meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities. They are parts of cultural landscapes that make various meanings. And *thirdly*, borders and borderlands are markers of national, regional and local identities. Sometimes these levels of identities coincide and sometimes they diverge. This depends on geographical

location as well as historical context (Wilson & Donnan 1998; Donnan & Wilson 1999).

In addition to the concept of identity, Donnan and Wilson also stress that one of the least understood and least studied aspects of international borders is culture. They use the concept of culture as a means to look not only on the formal arrangements between states but also on the "desires and other realities of the people who live at those borders, as well as the cultural significance of the borders to people in more distant metropolises" (Donnan & Wilson 1999: 11).

Inspired by these trends within anthropology, I will explore how the northern borderlands between Sweden-Norway and Finland-Russia were created and enforced as significant in Sweden around 1900. I will examine how various cultural meanings were expressed in the borderlands and show that formal border arrangements do not necessarily coincide with the cultural processes that are involved in the making of borders. In analyzing borderlands as cultural entities, various aspects can be taken into consideration. One that I will discuss, and which can be related to a widely defined cultural approach, is the importance of *material culture* in the making of borders.

I will situate the making of the Swedish-Norwegian and Finnish-Russian borderlands in what was known as "the Defence Question." During the latter half of the nineteenth century, there was a growing awareness among certain groups that the state of the Swedish military defence was critical. Urgent measures concerning everything from the introduction of a conscript army to equipment, technical training and the construction of fortifications was discussed. Different interest groups were created; these held meetings, raised funds, published brochures, and tried to influence the parliamentary process.

The fortification in Boden became a focal point that served as a resource to structure the arguments that depicted the threat from Russia that Sweden faced, according to the defence activists. Through this practice the northern frontier was enforced as something of great importance. The construction of the fortification is one way to analyze the meanings of material culture. Even if the fortification had not physically come into being in the 1890s, it nevertheless occupied a space created in brochures, the press, magazines and so forth. I will also analyze how temporal forms of material culture became another part of the making of borderlands.

I focus on brochures and articles that made up a crucial part of the defence question and that were widely circulated in the contemporary public sphere. This material has been discussed within Swedish historiography before, but not from these perspectives (Danius 1956; Nevéus 1965; Holmén 1985; Åselius 1994b). Previous research dealt with the defence question,

sometimes in a very detailed manner. But if we take it one step further, the brochures and the articles also became an active part of the production of borders in a symbolic as well as a real sense.[2]

Norrland as the Land of the Future

In order to understand why Norrland and the northern border became important, both as symbol and geopolitical issue, comprehending historical as well as contemporary processes is crucial. After the defeat in the war with Russia in 1809, Sweden lost Finland, and the northern border was drawn along the rivers of Torne and Muonio (see for example Lähteenmäki 2006). For much of the nineteenth century Norrbotten was not considered very important. It was seen as a remote wilderness, and due to its inaccessibility the military elites feared no attack. Economically the province was under-developed; farming methods were primitive and infrastructure insufficient (Björklund 1990: 21 f.).[3] At the end of the century, however, these conditions would change drastically, and this was clearly articulated in the debate about the defence.

During the second half of the nineteenth century there was a great economic boom in Norrland.[4] At the same time, with the northward expansion of the Swedish railway system, Norrland became more accessible. The board and wood pulp industry also developed, as did farming. In the context of this progress Norrland came to be considered as "the land of the future," as an America within the internal borders where national welfare could be accomplished.[5]

Concurrently with these developments, shifts within foreign policy led to further changes in the way Norrbotten was considered. In 1886 the railway lines in Finland reached the coastal city of Uleåborg. This meant that the Russians could move troops easily, and in 1903 the railway to the actual border was completed (Åselius 1994b: 70; Åselius 1994a: 199). During the 1880s and 1890s the Russian rule in Finland hardened. The relative independence that Finland had enjoyed within the empire, for more than half a century, was to a large extent abolished. Customs, currency and the post system were reformed according to imperial standards (Lindberg 1958: 113).[6] In the Swedish public debate and the security debate and within the security establishment, Russian policy in Finland was situated in a broader geopolitical frame of interpretation. The Russian will to expand westwards was considered a self-evident, almost natural, process (Lindberg 1950: 201).

Fennomanian nationalism became considered yet another problem. In the northern parts of Sweden-Norway a Finnish minority lived. During the course of the nineteenth century these groups grew bigger and in the latter half of the century they became objects of assimilation policy.[7] In this context, Fennomanism and the expansionist aspirations of the Russian empire

were seen as different sides of the same coin (Åselius 1994b: 199; Oredsson 2001: 25; Eriksen & Niemi 1981: 26–92).

To these factors we must add the state of the Swedish armed forces. During the second half of the nineteenth century there was a growing awareness that the army and the navy needed to be radically reformed and adapted to contemporary standards. But within the Parliament nothing happened. Some saw a solution as essential and initiated different organisations. One of the most important was Allmänna försvarsföreningen ['The Public Defence League']. These mostly conservative organisations played an important role in putting questions about the defence, but also about foreign policy in general and other contemporary issues, on the agenda (Cronenberg 1969; Björck 1946: 132).

All these factors were articulated and discussed simultaneously within the framework of the defence question, in various books, brochures and articles and through visual representations such as maps, drawings and photographs. These depictions should not be seen merely as a passive, reflective background, but as active, formative elements in the public debate. In understanding how the Swedish-Norwegian and Finnish-Russian borderlands were ascribed meaning and made more significant in the decades around 1900, the first step in the analysis is to discuss a geographical space, which was made into a vast borderland between Western civilisation and Eastern backwardness.

Mapping Boundaries

One of the best-known defence activists was the officer and publicist Gustaf Björlin (1845–1922).[8] In one of his brochures—*Vårt försvar mot norr* ['Our Defence in the North'] (1886)—he discussed Russian expansionism and orthodox religion, and argued that up north two different societies were confronted. The territory he referred to what we today call the North Calotte, made up of the northern parts of Sweden-Norway and Finland-Russia.

From the Middle Ages up until the present day the driving force of Russian nationhood, the unifying idea of being Russian, was, according to Björlin, a never-ending desire to expand. A desire we, the "children of the Occident," usually do not understand, since we tend to see the world "through the lens of modern civilisation" (Björlin 1886: 14). This way of describing Russia became more common in Sweden from the middle of the nineteenth century and onward (Eriksson 1939: 1–21).

In a brochure anonymously published in 1890, the Russian will to expand and the characteristics of the Russian people were brought forward. The brochure was organized as a conversation between an officer and a member of the Parliament. In the dialogue the officer represented the defence movement and the Member of Parliament the idea that the Swedish armed forces

were in good condition. The officer inculcates that Russia aspires power and greatness, and that the Slavic people would actively participate and collectively sacrifice themselves in any kind of enterprise that would serve to expand the empire ([Gernandt] 1890: 18 f.).[9] In this discourse the Russians were generally depicted as collectivist in contrast to the individualism of Occidental civilisation (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Brochures was one media form where the defence question was discussed and the Russian threat depicted.

Russian expansionism was also visually depicted. In 1902 the magazine *Vårt försvar* ['Our Defence'] published a map that showed the extension of the empire from 1533 to 1894. The gradual territorial expansion was illustrated by different graphic patterns, and in the north-western corner of the map there was a white field—the still unconquered nation of Sweden. The visual drama of the map stated that it was likely that the white area would be the next object. In addition to the texts, the map became a visual depiction of the threat Sweden was facing. As the expansionist agenda of the Russians was discussed, the importance of the border was enforced. In this context, defending the border became crucial. It altered the meanings of the borderlands, made them more visible, and ascribed them vital strategic meaning (Fig. 2).

The uncertainty and the dangers of the contemporary situation can be situated in a wider international context. In the book *Der Krieg in seiner wahren Bedeutung für Staat und Volk* (1892), the German general Albert von Boguslawski (1834–1905) stated that never before in world history had the balance between war and peace been as insecure as during the decades following the great Franco-Prussian war. The urgent desire of the French to win back the provinces Germany had "reconquered" during the war, the



Fig. 2. This map enables the observer to follow Russian expansion ever since the sixteenth century. The implicit message was that Sweden would be the next object.

development in the Orient, the political attitude of the Russians, and the passions found among most Slavic people resulted in continuous armament. The argument of Boguslawski is found in the introduction of a book on war and war institutions, by the Swedish officer Carl Otto Nordensvan (1851–1924), published in 1893 (Nordensvan 1893: 1). By relating the Russian threat not only to the situation in Northern Scandinavia but also to Europe and Asia, the outbreak of war was made more likely, which thus made improvements and reforms within the Swedish defence even more urgent.

In addition to the aspirations to expand, Björlin argued that in order to convert the nomadic "Lapp" population during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Russians established orthodox monasteries and churches. One of the most important was the monastery in Petchenga (today Petsamo), constructed during the first decades of the 1500s. After flourishing, the monastery was plundered in 1589. The decision to reconstruct it in the 1870s and the 1880s was considered as part of the strategy to secure the Russian Arctic Sea coast (Björlin 1886: 7–9, 27). It was also located close to the Norwegian-Swedish border. Orthodox religion was thus seen as a vehicle to forge a unified imperialist culture.[10]

In a brochure published in 1890, Björlin further discussed what was happening within the Russian empire.[11] In the spring of 1886 a burial took place in Reval (today Tallinn) in Estonia. As everywhere else in "the civilised world" the coffin was decorated with flowers and wreaths. After the priest had conducted his prayer the coffin was lowered into the ground. All

of a sudden a police officer appeared and ordered the mourners to raise the coffin and remove the decorations. A recent *ukas* (a decree or a regulation) from the Russian Minister of the Interior stated that Protestants were forbidden to use flowers and decorations in burying their dead. Björlin saw this event as an example on "the ruthless persecution" that affects our "former compatriots" across the Baltic Sea. The persecutions were not restricted to religious customs only; everything that was "marked by western culture" served as a target. The university in Dorpat (Tartu), the "proud memory" from the times when Sweden was a great power in the Baltic Sea region, was "already totally Russified" (Björlin 1890: 59 f.).

In the 1880s and 1890s, institutions in Finland became, as mentioned above, the object of Russification. This tendency is emphasized by Björlin in his 1890 speech where he describes "the process of assimilation" that threatens people which are subject to Russian rule. The cultures, religions and traditions of these people are in the long run bound to be destroyed. Barbarism threatens "civilisation," in this case Sweden and Norway, according to Björlin (60 f.).

In the 1886 brochure, Björlin compared the contemporary situation in the Norwegian Finnmark with the situation along the Russian Arctic Sea coast. Although the Russian government in 1868 decided to support the colonization of the Murmansk coast, it remained deserted eighteen years later. The only permanent town was Kola, with around 700 inhabitants. In the Norwegian Finnmark there were four towns with a total of more than 10,000 inhabitants. How does Björlin explain this huge difference? The most obvious explanation was the differences within the societies on each side of the border. Citing a Finnish newspaper, Björlin wrote that while the Norwegian Finnmark was a civilised area with "trade, magazines, doctors, clergy, nobility, post offices, telegraphs and steam ships," the Russian side of the border was "lawless" and "one vast desert" dominated by old socio-economical structures (Björlin 1886: 19 ff.).

Through these words Björlin created a geography that was physical as well as mental. Larry Wolff states that the "operations of mental mapping were above all association and comparison" (Wolff 1994: 6). During the Enlightenment, philosophers and other writers used this logic and created the notion of civilisation. Civilisation discovered its defining contrasts in "shadowed lands of backwardness, even barbarity" (Wolff 1994: 3). The observation in the Finnish paper must be situated in this context. In comparison, the two sides on the northernmost parts of the Kola Peninsula represent two radically different forms of societies. Sweden-Norway represented civilisation; Finland-Russia manifested the opposite.[12] In the context of borderlands, differences between societies and cultures were made visible.

This mental mapping related to the different sides of the border, made it a boundary not only between nations, but also between different levels of societal progress.

Demarcating Objects. The Material Culture of Borderlands

Mental mapping was one of the ways in which Swedish-Norwegian and Finnish-Russian borderlands were ascribed meaning. This mapping was interwoven with accounts describing the border in physical terms. In this section I will discuss how flags, border stones and portraits were important elements in the making of the border.

During the course of the twentieth century, flags as symbolic objects became an almost natural fact. In *Banal Nationalism* (1996), Michael Billig argues that we tend to associate the concept of nationalism with flags and banners used by right-wing extremists. Rarely do we reflect on what flags on government buildings mean and the role they play. Billig states that the idea of the nation is being continuously created in a banal way and on an everyday basis (Billig 1995: 5 f.). The use of flags as a national symbol is one of the traditions invented during the second half of the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1983). From then on, they have been a vital part of the symbolic and material repertoire of every nation-state.

Flags are also a decisive way of demarcating the border of the nation-state, which was exactly what the members of the Parliament saw in the summer of 1900. One obvious remark is that the flags in Haparanda and its surroundings had been put on display due to the official situation. In the mid-nineteenth century the use of flags in Sweden was related to military practice, official buildings and public events. The use of flags in Haparanda can be related to these older practises. But around 1900 a wider use became more common. In 1893 the ethnographer and museum founder Arthur Hazelius (1833–1901) initiated a national feast at Skansen—one of the oldest open-air museums in the world, inaugurated in 1891—on 6 June, and from 1916 to 1983 this day was celebrated as the day of the Swedish flag (Biörstrand 1967; Jonsson 1993).

It is impossible to visualise international borders during the past fifty years without flags. The Swedish flags in Haparanda expressed where one territorial entity ended and another one started. They also connected the centre of the nation with its periphery. In the context of the Torne Valley, one must also keep in mind that in 1888 four elementary state schools were founded, with the chief purpose of teaching the Finnish minority Swedish. These schools served as a means of Swedish assimilation policy (Elenius 2001). The flags became another way of expressing the linguistic national

homogeneity that the schools served to create. In this light, the flags in Haparanda in June 1900 became a decisive and multilayered way of enforcing belonging at the end frontier of the Swedish nation.

Another way of marking the border is border stones. In an article, published in 1904 in the Swedish Tourist Association Yearbook, Hugo Samzelius described the Finnish population living on the Swedish side of the Torne River (Samzelius 1904: 138–161). Even if the overarching purpose of the article was to describe the beauty and the richness of the area to potential tourists, Samzelius started his article by discussing the consequences of the treaty of Fredrikshamn in the autumn of 1809. In the treaty Sweden lost one third of its territory, and the Finnish communities, located on both sides of the Torne River, were shattered and divided by the state boundary.

The discussion of the border situation after 1809 was stressed by a photograph of one of the border stones along the Torne River (Samzelius 1904: 139). This border stone and others were put there after 1809 (Gustafsson 1995: 78). In the summer of 1888, the Finnish-Swedish border was overhauled, and the border stones were improved (Elenius 2001: 133). The anthropologists Samuel Truett and Elliott Young state: "National borders are where territorialization becomes real, where physical markers and barriers are erected, and agents of the state regulate the movement of people, goods and information" (Truett & Young 2004: 2). Border stones manifest, in a materially more permanent way than flags, where one territory ends and another one begins.

In Samzelius' article, the photograph sets the scene. Even if he does not explicitly discuss the border situation after the introduction, it nevertheless serves as a condition for the present. Border stones become a materially persistent way for the state to manifest its presence. They also serve as a means to physically inscribe the abstract border on the map and show that it is "real." The geographer James D. Sidway argues "that the representation on the map *coincides* with other systems of representation in which the border is narrated, cited and reiterated." Often borders are marked by rivers, and if not, they can be designated by border stones (Sidaway 2005: 192). In the case discussed here, the Torne River marked the border, and the border stones further inscribed the boundary.

Björlin argued that a conflict could have erupted between Russia and Sweden in the 1850s (Björlin 1886: 16 ff.; see also Björlin 1890: 68 f.). But the outbreak of the Crimean War drew the attention of the Russians elsewhere. In the 1870s and the 1880s, Finnish migration to Northern Norway resulted in the so-called *Finnish-Russian question*. In the Russian press headlines like "Oppressed Finns in Norway" were recurrent. Björlin presumed that the Russian plan was to let the Finnish language eventually expand west and

south and let the Fennomans follow with their agitation. And when the time had come the Russians would attack (Björlin 1890: 69).[13]

In Sweden, the political boundary did not correspond to the language border after 1809, and some saw the expansion of the Finnish language and population in the Norwegian Finnmark and the Torne Valley as a threat (Lundholm, Groth & Pettersson 1996: 80). The state schools in the Torne Valley served to control this development. By referring to a speech held by the official Simon Nordström (1831–1906) at the Geographical Anthropological Association, Björlin created a link between the Finns and the Russian desire to expand.

In his speech, Nordström stated that the closeness of "the Russian eagle" was getting more and more obvious. In the Finnish cottages, portraits of the Czar family were found, and there was also a wide use of Russian porcelain (Björlin 1890: 70). These artefacts served as an indication of the Russian expansionist agenda and were seen as a part of a Fennomanian project. They also made the Finns into a hostile other, living in the borderlands. Using the portraits and the porcelain as physical testimonies of contemporary political processes became another way of envisioning the threat Sweden was facing in its north-eastern borderlands.

The Gibraltar of the North

One powerful artefact that has been used for centuries in defending, enforcing and physically marking state borders is military fortifications. In the 1800s and up until the interwar period in the 1920s and 1930s, the art of fortification improved, and huge fortifications were constructed throughout Europe. The fortifications in Boden are among the most expensive military projects in Swedish history, and parts of them were taken into use in 1907. At that point the fortifications had been on the political agenda for almost three decades.

In his 1886 brochure *Vårt försvar mot norr* Gustaf Björlin discussed the necessary measures that were needed to reinforce Sweden's abilities to defend Norrland. Strategically, he stated, one must always remember that "Norrbotten is a *border county*." One fact illustrating this was a mixed population (Björlin 1886: 46 ff.). Three years later a short book was anonymously published. The book dealt with the defence question and showed how Sweden lost Norrland after being attacked by Russians ([Douglas] 1889).

Even though Norrbotten had constituted the only Swedish land border since the 1809 peace agreement, it had not been distinguished as significant. This vast territory was considered a wilderness where no major military operations could be launched (Cronenberg 1890: 36 ff.). The explicit discourse about Norrbotten as an important border area altered from the 1880s. So

did the criticism of the negligence in the past. According to the historian Sverker Oredsson the interest in defending Norrland was something new in the 1880s (Oredsson 1968: 292). The political and cultural processes that make borders and borderlands into meaning-carrying entities should not at first hand be related to the border agreement in 1809, but more to the developments and the public debate at the end of the century. One public arena where this can be observed was the defence question. Among other topics, the strategic importance of Norrbotten was discussed by agents like Björlin and Melander. They stated that different measures were required to strengthen the border defence, and one of the most crucial was the construction of permanent fortifications.

In the 1890s, political discussions on the fortification of Boden broadened; several expert inquiries were presented, and in articles and brochures defence activists argued that fortifications were a necessity (Cronenberg 1990). At a public lecture held in 1890, Björlin emphasized that a fortified Boden would mean that the enemy would have to increase its resources substantially (Björlin 1890: 76). In 1895 an anonymous author published a brochure entitled *Öfre Norrlands fasta försvar* ['The permanent defence of Upper Norrland']. Several of the arguments and outlooks embraced by the defence activists were formulated in this text. Since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia had pushed Sweden back step by step, as Björlin stated in one article: Russia has for a long time been "striving to the ocean" (Björlin 1888: 105). In relation to this expansionist agenda the Swedish defence needed to be reinforced. In case of war, the anonymous author argued that the country was facing its greatest threat along its north-eastern border. The main road across the Torne river was available during all seasons. In the event of an attack, a border fortification would radically improve the defence abilities. The anonymous brochure also brought forward the expansion of the railway network in Sweden, and in Finland, and stated that soon they would merge at the northern border ([S] 1895: 7–10).

This was also considered by Emil Svensén in his book *Sverige och dess grannar* ['Sweden and its neighbours'] (1901). In discussing Norrland, he brought forward the rich mineral assets and the electricity that the great waterfalls could supply. Eventually resulting in a prosperous industry and the growth of the population, both would serve to strengthen and secure the continuity of the Swedish national spirit. He stated that politicians and the military were very much aware that the railway transformed the geopolitical outlook. The railways did not only result in commercial opportunities (Svensén 1901: 124, 126). They also posed a threat. They enforced the significance of the north-eastern border and ascribed it strategic meaning. Or in the words of Emil Melander: the state border was not only a "geographical

concept" but had through the railway also "become a politically strategic" concept (Melander 1898b: 39).

The anonymous author continued to discuss how the railways in Finland made mobilization and movement of Russian troops a lot easier. In a future war, fortifications would therefore become necessary, and a fortification in Boden would have a crucial function. There was no other place in Sweden where natural conditions were more favourable. In the end of the brochure he brought arguments about economy and defence together. Whatever the outcome of a future war "against our fatherland, a fortified and unconquered Boden" would be "the key to the inexhaustible ore fields of Gellivara and Luosavaara" ([S] 1895: 22). A fortified Boden would guarantee the future visions that were linked to Norrbotten. The links among trade, industry and defence politics were brought together in the discourse on the fortification.[14] In addition, trade, industry and other forms of developments can also be related to the mental map of civilisation that was ascribed to the Swedish-Norwegian side of the border. National progress needed to be protected against Russian imperialist aspirations.

One well-known defence activist was Emil Melander, mentioned above. In several texts published in various contexts, he strongly argued that Boden needed a fortification. In the article "Framtidslandet" ['Land of the Future'] he described Norrbotten as the place of possibilities, and he also brought this together with the need to improve the defence. The place to do this ought to be where most roads intersected and the enemy thus had to pass. In Boden seven higways meet, the railway connected the village with the rest of Sweden, and in the future it would be linked with the railway in Finland and with the Atlantic Ocean at Ofoten (Melander 1898a: 7). If an enemy passed the border along the river of Torne, it was in a fortified Boden he could be stopped.[15]

In the geopolitical narrative that made the fortifications politically possible, the Russian expansionist desires were linked to the altered situation of the railways and the growing economy of Norrbotten. This narrative was produced in the defence question and through the activities that different organisations arranged, and it enforced the meanings and the significance of the north-eastern border. The fortifications in Boden thus became one of the focal points through which the central arguments in the debate could be formulated.

In the travel account by Julius Centerwall that was published in the yearbook *Svea*, Boden was situated in the broader economic expansion of the area. Members of the Swedish Parliament made a journey to Norrland in June 1900, and in Boden they were guided by an officer who showed them the hills where the fortifications would be constructed. Centerwall stated that once one had seen the future location of the fortification, one could

not doubt the immense meaning it would have for Sweden's defence capacities. The mountains surrounding Boden would be turned into "a Nordic inland Gibraltar" (Centerwall 1901: 109–113).

Alongside text descriptions, maps served to visualize the geographical situation of Norrbotten and the importance of permanent fortifications. In Björlin's brochure *Vårt försvar mot norr*, a map was included after the text. On the Finnish side, the newly opened railway between Vasa and Uleåborg was clearly marked. Observing a map like this meant something else in the 1880s and 1890s than it does today. As mentioned above, the expansion of the railway in the border areas held promises as well as threats. It served the visions of economic and societal progress, but also made northern parts of Sweden and Norway strategically more accessible. The textual descriptions of the railway were visually expressed through this map. Maps, illustrations and other visual sources were given meaning in specific historical contexts and should not be interpreted through the lens of the present.

In Centerwall's travel account, there was a map covering the vicinity of Boden. It underlined the strategic importance of Boden, and visually depicted what the author of *Öfre Norrlands fasta försvar* and Melander had discussed. In the year-book *Vårt försvar*, a map expressed the expansion of the Russian empire since the sixteenth century. At the same time it also implicitly underlined the importance of defending the border, and it is no coincidence that the year-book included articles about the strategic importance of Norrland ([A.S.] 1902: 19–28). In addition to the maps, pictures displayed the village of Boden and the mountain hills where the fortification would be constructed (*Hvar 8 dag* 1900: 553 f.; Melander 1898a or 1898b; Centerwall 1901).

Even if the details concerning the fortification were secret, it nevertheless worked as a resource in the arguments produced by the defence activists. Arguing about the need to construct this fortification, they also depicted the menace Sweden was facing. In addition, through the discourse about the fortification, the borderlands between Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Finland took on a new strategic meaning.

Through various accounts, the fortification was inscribed in the landscape. Ultimately it served as a state vehicle to physically manifest its presence, power and will to control and defend the borderland and the territory of the state. As the flags and the border stones, it marked national homogeneity at the peripheries of state territory.

Conclusion

Summing up the discussion, it becomes clear that if we situate the making of Swedish-Russian borderlands in the defence question around 1900, three

intersecting levels jointly made the border and the borderlands between Sweden-Norway and Finland-Russia culturally and politically significant.

Firstly historical and cultural accounts created a mental map where cultural differences between Sweden and Russia became separating factors. The Russian settlements along the Murmansk coast, on the eastern side of the Norwegian-Swedish Border, were compared to the way the Norwegians organized their society. The prosperity of the Norwegian Finnmark and the county of Norrbotten were contrasted to the vastness and backwardness that characterized the non-Swedish-Norwegian terrain; a backwardness that was often related to orthodox religion. Generally it is important to keep in mind that religion continued to play a crucial role in the forging of national identities throughout the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, something that research about nation-building has not focused very much upon.

Making the Russians, and to some extent the Finns, into the other, was very common in Sweden and in several other European countries during the second half of the nineteenth century. At the time of the Crimean War, the discourse about Russian otherness, and the cruelty of the Russian regime, was a dominant trope in the West-European press. However, the otherization of the Russians was not a simple dichotomy. Some argued that Russia could become a European civilization; that the Russians were positioned in between the Asian and the European cultures, but that the development of the Russian society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was Asian.

Secondly I explore these northern borderlands by analyzing material artefacts mentioned by contemporaries. Taking material culture into consideration is a fruitful way to understand how the territorial space of the state is created. I analyze artefacts that gained and gave a specific meaning in the context of borderlands. They served as a means to symbolically connect peripheral parts of the nation with the centre. Appearing in peripheral borderlands they also expressed the power of the centre. The flags that the members of the Parliament saw when they came to Haparanda expressed the reciprocal relationship between the centre and periphery. The border stones, some of them located along the Torne River, inscribed and manifested the boundary in a materially more persistent way. The portraits of the Czar family and the Russian porcelain served as indications of both Russian expansionism and Fennomanian aspirations.

Thirdly I discuss the meanings that were ascribed to the construction of the fortifications in Boden. During the 1890s several defence activists argued that Sweden needed to construct permanent fortifications. The purpose of those was of course to defend the nation against a hostile assault. The arguments draw on the expansion of the railway in both Sweden and

Finland, and the expanding industry in Norrbotten. The railway network resulted in better communications that served the Swedish economy, but at the same time the Russians could use them to move troops to the border. Defence activists like Gustaf Björlin and Emil Melander and organizations like Allmänna försvarsföreningen and Fosterländska studentförbundet used textual accounts, visual accounts—such as maps and photographs—and organized lectures to depict the menace Sweden was facing. In this discourse the fortification of Boden served as a means to bring together trade, industry, communications and defence politics into one overarching narrative.

The historical study of borderlands can benefit from analyzing significant political debates and all the layers of meaning that they express, such as the defence question, but also from looking at the material culture of past borderlands. Quite often materialities are left as traces of long gone geopolitical narratives. In 1900 the Swedish parliament decided to construct fortifications in Boden, and the first parts were taken into use in 1907. Throughout the twentieth century the fortress was continuously developed, and Boden became one of the biggest garrison towns in Sweden during the Cold War. In January 1998, the fortress was closed, and today the fortifications stand as a monumental manifestation of the meanings the Swedish north-eastern borderlands once had.

NOTES

[1] This article has been published in a longer version—"Das Gibraltar des Nordens. Die Herstellung des schwedisch-russischen Grenzgebietes um 1900"—in the anthology *Grenzregionen. Ein europäischer Vergleich vom 18. bis 20. Jahrhundert*, eds. C. Duhamelle, A. Kossert & B. Struck (Campus Verlag, 2007), pp. 123–152.

[2] There are also different possibilities to study the perception of the northern borderlands by those who lived there. In the area we can find Sami/Lapp and Finnish minorities. In the late nineteenth century both groups became the objects of state policy in several ways (see for example Eriksen & Niemi 1981; Elenius 2001; Lähteenmäki 2006).

[3] Carl af Forsell stated in the 1820s that most of the inner parts of Norrland were unknown (Höjer 2007: 82).

[4] At the beginning of the 1880s Swedish exports of iron ore were almost non-existent. The introduction of new methods, however, led to a dramatic increase in the following decades and in 1913 iron ore made up 8.5 percent of the Swedish export industry (Salmon 1997: 39 f.; Sörlin 1988: 56).

[5] The great expansion of the population also served as a sign. In an article on the defence of Norrland, Emil Melander (1856–1930) claimed that the population of Norrland in the beginning of the seventeenth century was 125,000. In the end of the 1890s it was 800,000. Even if these figures are not entirely correct they still depicted a crucial change (Melander 1898b: 37). Sörlin (1988: 58) writes that between 1870 and 1900 the population increased by 300,000 people.

[6] In 1898 Nikolaj Bobrikov (1839–1904) was appointed general governor, and in the following year the constitution was abolished. In the summer of 1899, thousands of intellectuals all around Europe signed a plea to the Russian Czar on behalf of the Finnish people (Oredsson 2001: 28; Polvinen 1995).

[7] In 1821 the Finns on the Swedish side of the Torne River numbered about 7,000. By 1860 their numbers had nearly doubled. In the Norwegian Finnmark the Kvens (the Norwegian name of the Finnish minority) made up 13 percent of the population in 1845 and in 1875 the figure was 24, 2 percent (Niemi 1995: 152, 154).

[8] Björlin's writings where widely circulated, printed in several editions, and some served as lectures in different public appearances (Ribbing 1930: 22). Björlin was the editor of various journals containing topics related to the defence question which were discussed (for information about his public activities see Jacobson 1924: 612–620). Ideologically he was conservative which generally characterized the men taking part in the defence movement (Cronenberg 1969).

[9] The Russian will to expand was also expressed by for example [S.] (1895: 6 f.), [A. S.] (1902: 23) and Hedin (1905: 79). In the brochure *Vår mest hotade provins* ['Our most exposed province'] Gustaf Björlin discussed the strategic importance of the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea and wrote that the commander of the Russian troops, just before they left the island in 1808, promised that sooner or later they would come back (Björlin: 1890: 4).

[10] Scholars often argue that the symbolic universe of nationalism replaced religion during the course of the nineteenth century. Describing the historical background to the genocide in Bosnia during the 1990s, Michael A. Sells (1996: 176) argues that "the religious element in nineteenth-century Serbian nationalism is far more important than works like Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* might lead us to expect."

[11] Björlin performed parts of this brochure as speech held in Uppsala in March 1890. The organizing body was Fosterländska studentförbundet ['The National Student League'], founded the previous year. It became a part of the defence movement and served to make students an active part of the defence efforts (Cronenberg 1969: 67, *Det flydda decenniet* 1899: 8–9).

[12] A similar mental mapping can be found in various travel accounts that compared the situation in the Swedish border town of Haparanda with the ones in the Finnish border town of Torneå. The Dane Ludvig Daa visited Torneå in 1867 and stated that the towns differed in many ways. Haparanda was modern with painted buildings. In Torneå the houses were run down and business activities had steadily been declining since 1809 (Lähteenmäki 2006: 31 f.).

[13] This is thoroughly covered by Eriksen & Niemi (1981).

[14] See also for example [v. Hbg.] (1898: 30).

[15] In the book *Fästningar och fästningskrig* (1907) B. A. Tarras-Wahlberg, captain in the general staff, generally discussed the purposes of border fortifications (Tarras-Wahlberg 1907: 13–19).

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The Nineteenth Century Norwegian-Swedish Border

Imagined Community or Pluralistic Security System?

ABSTRACT The aim of the article is to study the border between Norway and Sweden during the nineteeth century on the basis of Karl Deutsch's theory of "pluralistic security community" from the 1950s and modern international border theory and research literature on nation building processes.

The establishment of a non-violent border relationship including the development of a shared Norwegian-Swedish belief that political problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change, was an issue that Deutsch dated to the years after the peaceful dissolution of the political union between them —in 1905. Confronted with an overview of the history of the border during the union period from 1814 to 1905, the article claims that the demilitarized union zone was established already in the 1820s. The border was gradually solidified as a consequence of the development of modern cartography, but its significance was weakened as a result of the industrialisation during the nineteeth century. On the emotional level it seems possible to find expressions of bad feelings based on bad historical experiences having political consequences, up till today.

KEYWORDS border studies, Scandinavian history, Scandinavian studies, peace and war studies, the Scandinavian union, Scandinavian regionalism, security systems

Introduction

In 1953 Karl Deutsch presented his theory on "pluralistic security communities" in international politics (Deutsch 1953: 17): regions in which large-scale use of violence had become unlikely or even unthinkable. The term was extended to become a tool for describing groups of people who shared the belief that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change, that is without resort to large-scale physical force. Furthermore, people within a pluralistic security community shared sympathy and trust towards each other (Deutsch et al. 1957).

While Deutsch's original example of a "pluralistic security community" was the demilitarized US-Canadian borderline in 1819 (Deutsch et al. 1957: 34 f.), his most famous case was the establishment of the Scandinavian non-violence state system after the dissolution of the Norwegian-Swedish union in 1905. Later Scandinavian researchers have accepted and confirmed his theory on the establishment and the content of the Scandinavian "security community."[1]

In this article I will question the dating of the so-called *Scandinavian non-violence border system* by confronting it with some observations from Scandinavian border history. I will also discuss the relevance of Karl Deutsch's concept by comparing it to recent border theory as well as nation building theory mainly from the point of view of Norwegian historiography, in order to increase our understanding of the union and of "security communities."

In my opinion there are examples of armed threats related to Norwegian-Swedish border disagreements several years after the dissolution of the Scandinavian union, and the disarmament of the border between those two countries was established almost ninety years before 1905. In my view—and in concordance with modern border research—the development of the Scandinavian border was jeopardised by contradictory circumstances during the nineteenth century, but the dominant feature was that the border tended to become an ideological force for the construction of national identities in Norway, while its function as an armed defence line against foreign invaders gradually decreased during the peaceful ninety years of union with Sweden.

The border, the union and the sentiments

The nineteenth century started with political turmoil in Scandinavia. In 1814 Denmark lost its 434-year-old Norwegian province. Sweden was authorized by the great powers to capture it, but in the interim period between Danish and Swedish rule, the Norwegian elite seized the opportunity to convene a

constitutional assembly in which they adopted a constitution and thereby established a sovereign kingdom. Many of the articles in that constitution and its preliminary work had the character of being "instruments of quasi-international law" ("et kvasifolkerettslig instrument," Michalsen 2008: 14). They thereby strengthened the boundary towards Sweden.

The Swedish king had either to accept Norwegian sovereignty or to conquer Norway by force. He chose a combination of these options. First he invaded Norway. Then he accepted a cease-fire on the conditions that the Norwegian constitution was adapted to accommodate a union with Sweden and that the Norwegian parliament elected him as the new Norwegian king. In so doing he accepted the maintenance of the Swedish-Norwegian border. Nevertheless, the long-term Swedish plan was to erase the boundary to establish a new Scandinavian "peninsula-state" under Swedish rule, a "natural state," protected behind the Baltic Sea, The North Atlantic Ocean, and the wilderness in the high north. This was the dream of Crown Prince and later King Karl Johan of Norway and Sweden and his successors until the Norwegians forced the dissolution of the union in 1905 (Berg 2001; Berg 2005a). The main question in the account of the union by Bo Stråth (Stråth 2005) is why the integration project—and consequently the erasing of the border—failed.

The Norwegian-Swedish border is one of the few European state boundaries that have not been repositioned during the twentieth century (Wiberg 1996: 328) and thereby one of the oldest international borders still in existence. Its southern part was demarcated in 1661, and its northern part, up to the Varanger Fjord, was surveyed in 1751. However, the entire boundary demarcation was not accomplished until in 1897 when the so-called *Three-Country Cairn* (Norwegian *Treriksrøysa*, Swedish *Treriksröset*) was erected at the intersection between the two Scandinavian kingdoms and the Grand Duchy of Finland (Kjellén 1899: 300; Berg 2005a). At sea the border was still unclear when the union vanished in 1905. A lobster field, the Pig Skerries at the entrance of the Oslo fjord, caused numerous conflicts between Norwegian and Swedish fishermen. After exchanges of military threats between the two countries, the question of jurisdiction over these sunken rocks was turned over to international arbitration in 1909 (Berg 2005a: 191 f.).

The history of the Norwegian-Swedish boundary is in other words long and eventful. And although the borderline was stable during the nineteenth century, the memory of mutual armed border conflicts was vivid. In 1814 it was less than hundred years since the Swedish warrior king, Karl XII, fell at the Norwegian border fortress Fredriksten in a campaign to conquer Norway. During the union period that fortress, as well as that of Kongsvinger, became sacred in Norway as symbols of Norwegian resistance against any

foreign—that is Swedish—invader (Berg 2005b). There are good reasons to trust the many Swedish reports on Norwegian bad feelings towards Sweden at the beginning of the union period, exemplified by a leading politician, Gustaf Hamilton, in the 1820s: "The Norwegian nation hated the Swedes, as is usual between peoples who share the same border."[2]

Borderline and nation building

The Norwegians had good reasons for their fear that Sweden wanted the obliteration of the border. Their union partner also had the means to erase the border.

During the first fifteen formative years of the history of the Scandinavian union the highest state official in Norway, appointed by the king, was the governor (Norwegian *stattholder*). He served as both chairman of the government and as supreme commander of the army. He was appointed from the ranks of public servants in Sweden. This was an obvious indication of lack of royal confidence in his Norwegian subjects (Berg 2001: 82 f.).

During the first ten years after 1814 the governor carried out the disarmament of the border by shutting down a number of fortresses and even demolishing others. As all fortresses in question had been erected against Sweden and had been used as attack platforms as well as defence in many Danish-Swedish wars, this was hardly surprising (Berg 2001: 30 f., 35–41). But it is interesting that the pacification of the Norwegian border defence implied that from the beginning of the 1820s the border *was*, what Karl Deutsch observed it *to become* after 1905, without effective military fortifications. Already from the beginning of the 1820s the military installations between Sweden and Norway were removed or disarmed. The dissolution of the union in 1905 and the demolition of some new (and insignificant) border fortresses that had been erected from 1901 onward did not mark the beginning of peaceful neighbourliness, but a return to normalcy after a few years of militaristic sentiments around the turn of the century. The demilitarization of the border took place around 1820, not after 1905.

Although the Swedish army did invade Norway in 1821 to force the Parliament to political concessions (Berg 2001: 67–70), the liquidation of the border by military means was out of the question after 1814. It is however an important point in political science that boundaries between states are ambiguous entities. They can be both demarcation lines and integration belts simultaneously (Schack 2002). Their *significance* can (and does) vary from time to time and from case to case (Tägil 1977; Prescott 1990).

The significance of the Scandinavian border was first and foremost dependent on the development of the history of certain sciences during the nineteenth century, primarily geographical science.

The famous theory of the nation state as an imagined community was invented by Benedict Anderson, who also has identified the map, the census and the museum as key factors behind the creation of nation states (Anderson 1991: 163–185). The professional and scientific mapping of national territories was—like the collections of more or less national items in museums and the development of the profession of the historian—expressions of the development of modern nationalism. The mapping was "loaded with political significance," especially in the turbulent Napoleonic period (Short 2001: 15). Geography was especially important in the construction of national identity in "the fledgling nations" (Short 2001: 15) such as the USA, were the "boundary makers" "personified the intimate tie between mapping and politics" (Wilford 2000: 205, 228). From 1838 the American map-makers were even organized in an elite branch of the Army, the Corps of Topographical Engineers (Wilford 2000: 227). In general this military dominance in the development of cartography can be illustrated with the fact that as late as 1867 about half of the delegates at the European congress for measuring the longitudes, were officers (Widmalm 1990: 119).

Norway offers an excellent case for the development of politicized cartography. The land surveying competence was situated in the army until the middle of the nineteenth century (Berg 2001: 91–98). It was an obvious part of the physical nation building. The process of the political mapping of Norway in order to reinforce its boundaries can even be dated with great accuracy.

In 1836 the Norwegian parliament demanded that the army—under solely national command since the death of the last Swedish governor—should draw up a national plan for the military defence of Norway. This plan was delivered by the military specialists in 1840. It disregarded the official geographical and geopolitical justification for the Swedish-Norwegian union, namely the theory of the "peninsula-state" defended by the surrounding seas and bound together by the mountain range, Kjølen, in the middle. Instead of this official doctrine it launched the idea that the two union states consisted of several geographically independent defence districts divided by the Kjølen mountain range. The western districts grew out of and originated from Norwegian rivers, running from the valleys north of Oslo and south into the Skagerrak and the North Sea. The Norwegian rivers made up an independent water system, according to the Norwegian defence planners, while a major Swedish river, Klarälven, and the Swedish lakes south of its mouth were another independent water system. In other words, the unionist geographical peninsula perspective was challenged by a national-geographical and topographical border concept based on the watershed between the drainage basins and the outlets of the different rivers (Berg 2001: 121–124). Thus the border was consolidated.

The scientific reasons for this cartographic consolidation were based on the idea that borders between states as a rule ought to follow watercourses and rivers. This theory originated from German cartography in the 1820s. It challenged an older French geographical theory that claimed that mountains, not watersheds, were the elements for natural borders. Swedish cartography belonged to the French camp in this geographical struggle (Widmalm 1990; Kjellén 1899: 326 f.). Furthermore, the scientific split between the Scandinavian map-makers reflected and reinforced the political split.

As Norwegian and Swedish cartographers were ordered by their common king to draw a Scandinavian map, they failed to carry out their order due to their inability to compromise on the key question of where to define the meridian of the union (Widmalm 1990: 363 f.). The Norwegian cartographers demanded that the Scandinavian map should be rooted at a meridian in Norway—in Kongsvinger with its national connotations (Berg 2001: 108–110; Slagstad 2008: 22). Their Swedish colleagues wanted the common meridian to run along the middle of Scandinavia, in other words in Sweden. Thus with two meridians, the union map became inaccurate. Both maps actually became misleading as a result of this first (and by no means last) Norwegian-Swedish struggle for national prestige with political implications. The geography was politicized as a result of political fear of amalgamation. The significance of the border was enhanced due to the Norwegian opposition to Scandinavian integration.

The fight over the meridian was—as well as the opposing views on rivers and mountains in map constructions—an international struggle within the geographical profession. The Americans, for instance, preferred Philadelphia and later Washington as prime meridians, while the British insisted on Greenwich. The latter turned out to be the winner. But as late as in 1881 there were still fourteen different prime meridians in use in international cartography (Short 2001: 15, 189; Wilford 2000: 257 f.).

The American geographer, John Short, has labelled the map as a prime ideological apparatus for the education of the citizens in the field of national consciousness during the nineteenth century (Short 2001: 11 and passim). It obviously provided some important premises for Frederick Jackson Turner and his thesis on "[t]he Significance of the Frontier in American History" and the alleged specific American attraction to the undiscovered, the "wilderness." The same might be said of Norwegian internal expansionism into the Sami wilderness in the High North in the second half of the nineteenth century. One consequence of the expansion into the Northern wilderness was that the border between the two kingdoms in the union, Norway and Sweden, was stiffened. At the same time the penetration into the High North both in Norway and in Sweden was a manifestation of the advance

of modernity in the period of the industrial revolution, boosted by the great upheavals in European great power politics that originated from the German unification.

In the long run the borderline was not strengthened, but softened as a result of an ideological struggle between the "Scandinavianists" and the Norwegian and Swedish nationalists respectively during the nineteenth century. The background to this struggle between competing nation building versus region building projects was the impact of the German unification processes and the imperialist scramble between the great powers which made the minor states feel threatened in an international fight for survival of the fittest. The Scandinavian solution was regional integration: either Swedish-Norwegian state building or Nordic unification, the latter meaning the unification of the two union states plus Denmark. Such contemplations had considerable political attractive force during the middle period of the union years and especially within liberal circles. As Ruth Hemstad has shown, the Scandinavianist alternative to Norwegian nationalism did not disappear even in the harshest nationalistic atmosphere prior to the dissolution of the union in 1905 (Hemstad 2008).

The idea of Scandinavian cooperation and even political amalgamation did represent a threat to the border and certainly had the effect of undermining its significance. But it was particularly the expansion of communications and industry during the nineteenth century that weakened it.

The most spectacular tool for modernization during the nineteenth century was probably the railway. At least, it revolutionized the Scandinavian union as a viable state unit. The first railway line that knit together the two capitals in the union—Oslo and Stockholm—opened in 1871 (Østvedt 1954: 171), reducing the travelling time from five to six days to 17 hours during summer season in the 1890s (Berg 2005a: 187). It is said that the railway abolished time. It certainly reduced the relevance of the border.

The railway technology also expanded into the High North and eased the access to the Northern "internal America" (Sörlin 1988) in Norway as well as in Sweden for the immigration of smallholders and industrialists alike. When the railway was completed between the Swedish mountain tableland and westward and down to the deep sea harbour town of Narvik in 1903, this fact accelerated the process of erasing the border as a barrier between the two countries (Berg 2005a: 186) by providing an outlet for the Swedish iron ore export in the heydays of industrialism. However, the railway in the north also alarmed the two military establishments in the union so much that in 1904 the Norwegian and the Swedish general staffs signed an agreement on joint defence along it—secret, of course, in the atmosphere of jingoism at that time—in case of a Russian attack (Berg 2001: 269–272).

Unavoidably and independently of the clandestineness, the border lost significance and was weakened.

During the whole period from its foundation until present time the Scandinavian boundary was only of theoretical interest to one type of industry in the north, namely the trans-national reindeer husbandry in the areas where Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian interests opposed one another (Niemi 2005: 388). The Fennoscandinavian reindeer-herding Sami could have been seriously hurt by the border treaty of 1751, but they were not. The border convention had a codicil, the Reindeer Grazing Codicil, that guaranteed the continuation of the grazing pattern: on the (Swedish) highland in the winter, and at the (Norwegian) coastline in the summer. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the reindeer grazing guarantee was endangered as a consequence of the Norwegian and Swedish agricultural and industrial penetration into their "internal America" and of a general Scandinavian russophobia in the High North (Niemi 2005: 390–401). Traditional reindeer grazing districts were partitioned up and allocated to the land clearers from the south, especially on the Norwegian side. From the 1870s several projects of land clearing had the explicit aim of securing the border areas by a solid and ethnically Norwegian smallholder population (Niemi 2005: 403). And the dissolution of the union in 1905 reinforced the tendency towards the weakening of the Sami culture, a tendency that was not halted until the 1970s (Berg 1995; Pedersen 2006; Lundmark 2008).

One particular source for potential resource competition was Klarälven. It originates in Norway, named *Trysilälva*, and has its outflow in Sweden after a long journey down one of the most fertile Swedish valleys. It continues into the biggest Swedish lake, Vänern, which in its turn supplies another river with water that reaches the ocean in the second largest city in Sweden, Gothenburg. Klarälven in other words was of decisive importance to Sweden. Those Swedish politicians who negotiated the dissolution of the union in 1905, were aware of that importance (Berg & Jakobsson 2006). As the upstream state, Norway had the power to disturb and even terminate the flow of water in Klarälven. This would seriously harm logging, agriculture and, not least, the "industrialisation of the river," as Eva Jakobsson has labelled it, driven by the hydro-power lobby that during the first decade of the twentieth century conquered both rivers and river legislation (Jakobsson 2002). Out of these considerations, Sweden, as a precondition for the dissolution of the union, claimed that Norway should guarantee not to change the trans-boundary watercourses. The Norwegians accepted this claim on the realisation that a refusal of doing so would imply such grave risks for Sweden that its acceptance of the peaceful dissolution of the union was doubtful. The non-violent outcome of the dissolution thus became the

victory of nature over politics. And the border became irrelevant by the Norwegian-Swedish river convention of 1905 (Berg & Jakobsson 2006).

The 92 years of border guard during the union period ended with the erasing of it in certain important areas: the water would run unhindered across it. The railway in the north and the military along it became so integrated that the border was next to nullified.

The river convention of 1905, the peninsula railway, and the general staff agreement in 1904 may be classified as more important in the perspective of Karl Deutsch than some fortresses along the border. Their strength was dismissed by Norwegian as well as Swedish officers in 1905 (Berg 2001: 287–289). In general the risk for belligerency in connection with the dissolution of the union in 1905 has been characterized as solely a myth (Åselius 2006: 37, 40). As a matter of fact war was out of the question even as a theoretical speculation, as the Norwegian negotiators realized that the trans-boundary watercourses had such relevance—as we know from numerous international conflicts—that they accepted the continued free flow independent of some borders that had been drawn in a situation when Scandinavia was a war zone. From the 1820s the border between the union partners had ceased to be a war zone as a result of their demilitarisation and therefore as a result of the union.

The union and a sustainable peace area

The British ambassador to Norway summed up the Scandinavian relations during the First World War in rather gloomy words:

> [T]he Scandinavian races [...] have fought, oppressed, hated and distrusted each other, and, judging by their history, with good reason for doing so. They dislike and distrust each other still, and will doubtless continue to do so (Findlay 1922).

This observation might be shocking to modern Scandinavians who tend to forget that the land strip between the Baltic and the North Atlantic has been a scene of bloodshed for hundreds of years some few generations ago. The borders in these parts of Europe were what Malcolm Anderson categorizes as the original form of borderline between states, a "zone in which one faced the enemy" (Anderson 1996: 9). So obvious was this interpretation of the border by the beginning of the union, that Gustaf Hamilton defined what he understood as the Norwegian *hate* towards their forced union partners as *normal* "between peoples who border each others."

Karl Deutsch dated the disappearance of hate as a motivating factor behind neighbourly relations along the Scandinavian border to the demoli-

tion of the Norwegian border fortresses after 1905. In this article I have argued for going back to the formative years of the Norwegian-Swedish union to trace the abandonment of the border as a war region. The demilitarization of the Norwegian war tools in the 1820s seems more relevant than the demolition of some forts after 1905 that nobody evaluated as effective means for stopping an enemy or for waging war. And while the development of geographical research served as a means of consolidating the border as a practical way of building the nation and the national identity, modern infrastructure technology drained the border of its importance as an obstacle to peaceful interrelations during the nineteenth century modernization process. The river convention in 1905 seems to be the ultimate proof of the irrelevance of the border and the most important triumph for the will to establish a true "pluralistic security community" with the character of a non-armed security system.

On the other hand the conflict over the Pig Skerries was so grave *after* 1905 that it could not be solved without years of negotiations, accompanied by military threats, and not without international arbitration (which Norway lost). That certainly is an indication of continued mistrust between the neighbouring people after 1905.

In the referendum on the European Union in 1994 a Swedish newspaper interpreted the Norwegian "no" as an echo of 1905 (Berg 2000: 155) and thus a manifestation of the survival of rancour from those days. Though violent options for conflict resolution were ruled out once and for all by the free flow water agreement in 1905, the memories of animosity as a political factor apparently lived on.[3]

NOTES

[1] Raymond Lindgren adapted Deutsch's theory as a key to understanding "alternatives to war as a method of settling international disputes," which he declares in the introduction to his monograph on the Norwegian-Swedish union (Lindgren 1959). Bengt Sundelius took his point of departure in Deutsch' theory in his studies on European foreign policy making processes (Sundelius 1982). Iver B. Neumann related Deutsch and his Scandinavian case study to a discussion on European regionalism (Neumann 1992). I applied Deutsch in my studies on the Nordic cooperation during the First World War (Berg 1997). And in 2000 Magnus Ericson discussed the Scandinavian social democrats on the basis of Deutsch's theory (Ericson 2000).

[2] "Norska nationen hatade svenskarna, såsom vanligt är mellan folkslag, som gränsa intill varandra" (Carlquist 1921: 85).

[3] In this article I have only looked close at the Swedish-Norwegian border. But even Karl Deutsch's dating of the establishment of the North American peace system along the US-Canadian border, 1819, seems to be obscured by the bloodless though serious enough Pig War between Great Britain and the United States over the final sticking points along

their Northwest boundary in 1859, thirteen years after they had agreed upon the rest of the boundary line north of the Oregon Country. A battleship threatened infantries a period of time at one of the smaller islands in the border basin in this last outburst of American violence between the Anglo-American brother states. The outcome of that small but belligerent incident was the last completion of the boundary line between the two states—after decades of negotiations and finally after mediation from the German Kaiser—in 1872 (Vouri 1999).

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Reviews/ Comptes rendus/ Besprechungen

Olle Sundström, *"Vildrenen är själv detsamma som en gud." "Gudar" och "andar" i sovjetiska etnografers beskrivningar av samojediska världsåskådningar* (Nordliga studier 1), Umeå 2008 ISBN 9789188466747, 382 pp.

Olle Sundström studies the history and conceptual preferences of Russian ethnography in his dissertation. The focus of the work is on the study of Nganasan Samoyeds, a small aboriginal group of Northern Siberia.

Comparative study of culture and religion is constantly being faced with the problem of finding suitable terms for classification and analysis. Should we use native concepts and terms or should we use scientific terms that make the comparison possible? The *etic/emic*-discussion in the 1970s introduced by Kenneth L. Pike made the problem of conceptualisation apparent, and especially in studies based on field work the tendency to use native terms increased. But the notion of conceptual ambiguity is not enough in comparative studies. We should know more about the history and meanings of widely used metatheoretical terms, especially in the comparative study of religion: the main concept, 'god', has a long history with multiple sources based on the concepts of the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic religions. The same problem concerns other religious terms used in Europe.

Hence, Olle Sundström takes up relevant questions in comparative religion. He deals with the main problems of comparative work, but the field in which he deals with these questions makes his work even more important. Today in cultural anthropology and religious studies, the knowledge of Soviet ethnography is limited. Though we know a good deal about the studies of Russian and Siberian ethnic groups in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to the Revolution, we know very little about them in the Soviet era (1917–1991). The reason is not the language of publications, but the fact that books were published in small quantities and international relations of the Soviet researchers were weak, because of the political controversies, the "iron curtain," between Western and Eastern Europe, and other obstacles to international communication.

The control of the new Soviet state was tight: researchers had to follow the rules of the administration of the huge country if they wanted to do or continue their work. A great many ethnographers were arrested and executed in Stalin's time. Intellectuals were aware of the current political tendencies. However, the aim of creating scientifically important knowledge lived on among them and led to self-monitoring and to the selection of themes that were approved by the authorities. Many researchers also had international contacts, but they were loyal to the paradigmatic views of Soviet Russian research and interpreted their works on the basis of their own world view.

Olle Sundström selected the study of Nganasans for his case. Why? One reason might be the archaic culture of the group, which facilitated research into questions popular in Soviet ethnography: the Marxist ideas of the evo-

lution of society and religion. The Nganasans are also known in the Western world because Andrey A. Popov, the first important field worker to study them, published interesting shamanic accounts of them. Because of the work of Popov and others, members of two Nganasan families became perhaps the best known of the Siberian shamans in the Western world. They were made famous for example through a film by Lennart Meri, subsequently president of Estonia.

So, Olle Sundström handles one of the main problems of comparative religion: what kinds of terms and concepts can we use in writing about the religion of another culture? The work approaches these problems by studying the scientific practice of the Soviet researchers in their works on Samoyedic, especially Nganasan religion. The topic and questions are well defined and interesting, and the work is a case study of the theoretical discussion of terms and concepts in religion in Soviet research. Olle Sundström knows both the theoretical discussions in comparative religion and the working conditions and ideological tendencies among the Soviet researchers very well. His knowledge of Soviet ethnography, especially the study of Samoyedic religions, is excellent. Before looking more closely at Sundström's questions and results, I want to say that we are dealing with a very rare and interesting work in comparative religious studies.

Chapter 2, on theoretical and methodological choices, presents a great number of researchers who have handled the problem of 'god' and other concepts in religious studies. The chapter begins with a long discussion of the ideas of Monica L. Siems, Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Kimmo Ketola. They were not the first to take into account the Judaeo-Christian background of the concept of 'god' in comparative research, and Sundström later deals with many other writers who may have made more significant theoretical contributions. Hence, the chapter is not as clear as it could be. It would have been better to begin with William Paden, who provides a detailed analysis of the concept of 'god', or with the Benson Saler's family-resemblance theory. They simply have an analytically wider perspective than the first ones. There are also some other problems. Whether we should, for example, favour *religion* or *world view* when we talk about non-institutional oral religions is important when studying Soviet religious ethnography. The chapter ends with an analysis model, which is, however, well thought-out and a good working tool.

Chapter 3, on the research into religion by the Soviet researchers, is a fine piece of work. There might have been a little more information on the research conducted in the nineteenth century: new guidelines for research were given in the 1880s and that increased the research material produced by field work. Also, how were researchers able to use the old materials of non-communist times or what kind of international contacts did they have? In particular, Vladimir N. Basilov and Galina N. Gracheva took part in international conferences.

In chapter 4, which deals with the research on Nentsy, Entsy and Selkup religious beings, we could ask the same question: how did the Soviet ethnographers utilise the material of the earlier Western researchers (Castrén, Lehtisalo, Holmberg-Harva)? A long passage on Pater Wilhelm Schmidt, the

creator of the unbelievably large book series *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, raises questions. Was Schmidt known in the USSR? Probably not, because he saw monotheism as a basis for all religions. His sources were very thorough, even though he did not do field work among the Samoyeds.

The length of the analysis of the research on Nganasan terms and concepts in chapter 5 begins with information on the group, its history, ecological environment and livelihoods. Of the researchers who have studied Nganasan religion, Sundström analyses the hypotheses, systematic approaches, terms, concepts and results of Andrey A. Popov, Boris O. Dolgikh, Yuriy B. Simchenko and Galina N. Gracheva. He shows how the Marxist ideas of evolutionism were used by different researchers and compares the results of researchers with each other and with the main paradigmatic axioms of Soviet ethnography. The Nganasans' archaic world view with female deities was for example interpreted as telling of an ancient matriarchal society. Sundström's analysis deals with interpretations of most of the religious beings of the Nganasans; it is meticulous and reliable. However, a person who has done field work would ask how the gender, ethnicity and personality of researchers affected their field work material. Who were the informants? How did they influence the collected material?

As a whole, Olle Sundström's doctoral dissertation is an unusually fine piece of research work. The ideas of Soviet ethnographers and especially their religious studies are not an easy topic for a Westerner. But Sundström has succeeded in meeting the challenges and has produced a great deal of new information. His study is very impressive, the topic is well defined and his analysis is thorough. He sees the Soviet researchers he has studied in a balanced way. They did not especially want to write as the political establishment wanted, but used the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in a way they themselves believed in. Their own world view affected their hypotheses and results. We now know much more about Soviet religious studies. Sundström's book would be even more important if it could be translated into English for an international community of researchers.

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Claes Rosenqvist (ed.), *Artister i norr. Bottnisk och nordnorsk teater och underhållning på 1800-talet* (Acta Regiae Societatis Skytteanae 62), Umeå: Kungl. Skytteanska Samfundet 2008 ISBN 9789186438340, 459 pp.

Mit dem Buch über die Theaterkünstler im Norden beschließt nun die Forschungsgemeinschaft "Theater der nördlichen Regionen der Ostsee und Norwegens im 19. Jahrhundert" vorläufig ihre Arbeit. Seit Mitte der 90er Jahre hat diese Gruppe von Wissenschaftlern aus Finnland, Schweden und Norwegen eine Reihe von Büchern veröffentlicht, in der die langsame Ausbreitung theatraler Unterhaltungen in die nördlichsten Teile Skandinaviens und Finnlands untersucht wurden. Geographisch gesehen umfasst das Projekt Orte, die nördlich von Wasa in Finnland, Sundsvall in Schweden och Trondheim in Norwegen liegen. Die Wege, auf denen das Theater diese verkehrs- und bildungsmäßig abgelegenen Städte eroberte, werden in dieser Buchserie im Einzelnen dargestellt. Dabei hat es sich unter anderem erwiesen, dass die Verbindungen öfter in ost-westlicher Richtung verliefen, wenn die Künstler einmal den Weg vom Süden in den Norden zurückgelegt hatten.

Zwar zielte das Projekt ursprünglich auf die Verbreitung von Theater im Norden des Nordens ab, aber es zeigte sich alsbald, dass die herkömmliche Auffassung von "Theater" für Verhältnisse des 19. Jahrhunderts unzulänglich war. Claes Rosenqvist, Professor der Literaturwissenschaft an der Universität Umeå, hat dies schon in seiner Arbeit von 2003, *Norrlandskustens teaterpionjärer* ['Theaterpioniere längs der nordländischen Küste'] angedeutet. Im ersten Kapitel des nun vorliegenden Buchs entwickelt er diese Überlegungen weiter. Auch wer sich nur wenig für die Details des nordländischen Theaters interessiert, kann sich mit Gewinn mit diesen einleitenden Reflexionen auseinandersetzen.

Für Rosenqvist lässt sich die kulturelle Eröffnung dieser nordschwedischen Industriestädte, die sich über das ganze 19. Jahrhundert hin erstreckt, nicht mit traditionellen Definitionen von Theater beschreiben. Was hier von fahrenden Künstlern angeboten wurde, muss mit dem Begriff Unterhaltung im breitesten Sinne des Wortes verstanden werden. Dafür können mehrere Gründe angeführt werden. Einmal war das Theater des 19. Jahrhunderts prinzipiell nicht auf "hohe Kunst" eingeschränkt. Auch in den Hauptstädten hatte das Theaterwesen eine Breite, die sowohl das Drama als auch Einakter, Farcen, lustige Monologe, Tiere auf der Bühne, equilibristische Darbietungen und nicht zuletzt musikalische Umrahmungen aller Art mit einschloss. Da die nordskandinavischen Städte oft nur wenige Tausend Einwohner zählten, mussten die reisenden Truppen Unterhaltungen anbieten, die die ganze Bevölkerung anzogen. Nur so konnten sie eine längere Zeit am Ort bleiben und der Weg in die nächste Stadt war weit. Schließlich argumentiert Rosenqvist dafür, dass gerade die vielen Gruppen, die Unterhaltung anboten, die im Grunde wenig mit traditionellem Theater zu tun hatten, auf längere Sicht den Weg für die künstlerisch anspruchsvolleren Theatertruppen des späteren Jahrhunderts bereiteten.

Theoretisch stützt sich Rosenqvist unter anderem auf die von der französischen Annales-Gruppe entwickelte *la longue durée*, die er treffend als

"zähe Strukturen" bezeichnet. Denn nur über lange Zeiträume hin lassen sich die allmählichen Veränderungen des Angebots von öffentlichen Unterhaltungen angemessen bewerten. Wenn die heutige Forschung Gattungsbegriffe wie Theater, Drama oder Kunst von Darbietungen von dressierten Tieren, Akrobaten, musikalischen Equilibristen, Männerquartette etc. unterscheidet, dann hat das mit den Gegebenheiten des 19. Jahrhunderts wenig zu tun. Somit wird hier Theater als Sammelbegriff verstanden, der im Wesentlichen der modernen Theaterwissenschaft entspricht: So wie Performance Art, Neu-Zirkus, Stand-up comedy, postdramatisches Theater, Tanztheater und so weiter als Theater betrachtet werden, so hat Rosenqvist diesen Begriff auch für das 19. Jahrhundert zurechtgelegt. Diese Begriffsbestimmung dient also nicht nur den örtlichen Verhältnissen, sondern hat eine weitreichende historische Bedeutung. Ausgehend davon wäre noch der Schluss zu ziehen, dass das Theater als hohe dramatische Kunst in der Theatergeschichte nur eine kurze, parenthetische Epoche ausmacht. In Meyers Konversationslexikon von 1893 wird unter dem Stichwort *Theater* noch nicht eine Kunstgattung, sondern ein Gebäude angegeben. Nur im metaphorischen Sinne bedeutet es auch beispielsweise den dramatischen Corpus einer Nation. Rosenqvists Ansatz einer Umdefinierung von Theater har somit sowohl historische als auch zukunftweisende Bedeutung.

Die Einzeldarstellungen über die verschiedenen Orte, die in diesem Buch vorliegen, gründen sich auf minutiöse Archivstudien. Wie sahen diese Städte bevölkerungsmäßig aus, im quantitativen Sinne als auch statistisch im Bezug auf Klassen, Bildung und Einkommen? Wie konnten sie verkehrstechnisch erreicht werden — vor und nach dem Ausbau des Eisenbahnnetzes? Wie lange konnte eine Truppe wie Frau Melbloms "Zirkus-Gymnastik" beispielsweise in Piteå auftreten? Ein wichtiges Material für die Forschung kommt aus den Zeitungen, in denen die Künstler ihre Auftritte bekannt gaben und in denen auch bisweilen ein Redakteur etwas über den Auftritt berichtete. Erst gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts gab es regelrechte Theatergebäude, weshalb das Publikum früher in die verschiedensten Lokalitäten eingeladen wurde. Bisweilen konnte ein Sozietätshaus einen größeren Saal bereit stellen, aber auch wesentlich primitivere Gaststuben, Privathäuser und Scheunen wurden bespielt. Die Menge und der Reichtum des verwendeten Materials ist imponierend. Hier wurde ein wirklicher Pioniereinsatz für die Forschung geleistet, der nicht nur die theatralen Gegebenheiten betrifft, sondern sich über das gesamte öffentliche Kulturleben einer Region erstreckt.

In einem gemeinsamen Kapitel folgen Claes Rosenqvist und der finnische Bibliotheksdirektor Asko Rossi zwei einheimischen Truppen auf ihren Reisen durch Nordschweden und Finnland. Diese professionellen Theaterunternehmen machten in den 1870- und 1880er Jahren noch etwas Furore, konnten sich aber letztlich doch nicht ökonomisch durchsetzen. Ein einziges Misslingen zehrte das Kapital der Truppe auf. Wie wichtig die Musik als Vorläufer und Ergänzung des Theaterwesens zu bewerten ist, zeigt Leif Jonsson, Musikprofessor in Trondheim, in seinem Kapitel über "Das Konzert als Bildung und Vergnügen". Die Musik als Ausdruck nationaler Bewegung wird besonders hervorgehoben. Dazu trugen besonders die Musik-

corps der militären Verbände sowie die verschiedenen Chorvereine bei. Asko Rossi untersucht in einem weiteren Kapitel die Bedeutung der finnischen Schauspielerin und Truppenleiterin Maria Silfvan, die er als eine wichtige Persönlichkeit des finnischen Theaters hervorhebt, obwohl sie in schwedischer Sprache spielte. Schließlich wendet sich der norwegische Theaterforscher Thoralf Berg aus Trondheim ganz nach Norden, um die Situation in den Städten Tromsø, Hammerfest und Vadsø darzustellen. Hier hatten beispielsweise die professionellen, reisenden Truppen die Konkurrenz mit den örtlichen Amateurtheatern aufzunehmen, eine Konkurrenz, die lange nicht immer zugunsten der Berufsschauspieler ausfiel.

Was sich im Einzelnen in all jenen Städten nördlich des Polarkreises zugetragen hat, lässt sich hier nicht wiedergeben, aber es ist wohl der Mühe wert, sich diese detailreichen Kapitel zu Gemüt zu führen. Denn eines wird sehr deutlich in diesen 450 Seiten: Theater kann vieles beinhalten und Theater — so wie es Rosenqvist versteht — veränderte das öffentlichen Leben dieser nördlichen Region. Was in den Hauptstädten schon Gang und Gebe war, wird im Norden langsam erobert, aber gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts sind die Unterschiede nicht mehr wesentlich. Zwar ist das Angebot noch begrenz, was die Menge theatraler Unterhaltungen betrifft, aber qualitativ nimmt die Anpassung zu: Was man in Tromsø, Luleå oder Oulu dargeboten bekommt, entspricht immer mehr dem Repertoire des übrigen Landes.

Auf dem farbigen Umschlag des Buches hat der Zeichner Peter Öhgren sehr schön die Tendenz des Buches zusammengefasst. Seite an Seite tummeln sich hier die Schauspieler mit den Geigern, Gewichthebern, Zirkuspferden, Vortragshaltern mit Lichtbildern, der tragischen und komischen Maske, einer Sängerin und einer Postkutsche im Tannenwald. Genau so haben die vier Verfasser von den *Artister i norr* ihr Buch konzipiert. Die Breite der Darstellung sowie ihr Detailreichtum beeindrucken den Leser weit über das regionale Interesse. Bleibt nur zu bedauern, dass dieses Buch bis auf Weiteres nur jenen Lesern zugänglich ist, die der schwedischen Sprache mächtig sind.

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Use indentation instead of a skipped line to mark the beginning of a new paragraph.

Notes should be numbered consecutively through the text and collected at the end of the article as endnotes.

3. References

Book

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Journal

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